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As a self-declared secular country, the Singapore state views the management of 
religion as of quintessential importance. Despite its declaration, Singapore’s version 
of secularism is distinct, especially in its application towards the Muslim community. 
This thesis investigates the nature of secularism employed by the state towards 
managing Islam, with a particular emphasis on the two most prominent Islamic 
organizations in Singapore, the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS) and 
the Islamic Religious Teachers and Scholars Association (Pergas).  
This thesis postulates that the state employs a variety to techniques to manage 
religion, which include harsh laws governing religion, formal and informal co-
optation. MUIS is both formally and informally co-opted, while Pergas is informally 
(ideologically/psychologically, not institutionally) co-opted. This is part of two 
strategies of the state: muscular secularism (where laws and formal co-optation are 
used) and calibrated secularism (informal co-optation is used). Co-optation is by no 
means a subservient relationship or an entirely negative process; rather it is merely a 
strategy that is often employed by both the state and a less powerful entity that 
benefits both parties.  
Co-optation is a two-way process, where there is agency on the part of the co-opted 
entities. That is to say, the co-opted organizations allow themselves to be co-opted. 
Again, both the state and the co-opted entities stand to gain from such an 
arrangement. 
The actions, inactions, statements and silence of these two organizations vis-à-vis the 
state are analyzed. Interviews and surveys were also conducted with members of the 
Muslim community to ascertain their perceptions of these two organizations’ 
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relationships with the state. These perceptions proved useful in assessing the true 
position of the organizations vis-à-vis the state. 
This paper combines the theoretical works on co-option with the specific empirical 
study on MUIS and Pergas. Not only is there a contribution to the literature on co-
optation and secularism (since a new framework is introduced), there is feedback 
towards the state and MUIS and Pergas, since the consequences of the state’s 
approaches are evaluated. A move towards liberal secularism in the state’s dealings 
with Pergas is advocated, as it is argued to prevent the emergence of alternative 





Glossary of terminologies and abbreviations 
 
 
AAM    Aspire and Achieve through Mentorship 
ABIM    Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement 
Ahlussunnah-wal-Jama’ah The school of thought most Muslims adhere to 
AMLA   Administration of Muslim Law Act 
AMP    Association of Muslim Professionals 
AKP    Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Turkey’s ruling party 
APEX    Ace PSLE Exams  
ARS    Asatizah Recognition Scheme 
Asatizah   Religious teachers or scholars  
Berita Harian   Sole Malay vernacular newspaper in Singapore 
BGM    Biannual General Meeting 
CE    Compulsory Education 
Darurat   Exigent circumstances  
DRH    Declaration on Religious Harmony 
EIP    Ethnic Integration Policy 
Fatwa    Religious Edict 
Fitrah/Zakat   Alms required to be given by Muslims 
GRC    Group Representation Constituency  
Hajj    Pilgrimage to Mecca which is one of the five pillars in 
Islam 
Halal    Something permissible by Islamic law 
Hijab/Tudung   Islamic headscarf donned by Muslim women 
HOTA    Human Organ Transplant Act 
IR    Integrated Resorts 
IRCC    Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles 
ISD    Internal Security Department 
Jamiyah One of Singapore’s oldest and most influential Muslim 
organizations  
JI    Jemaah Islamiyah (Terrorist Organization in Southeast 
Asia) 
LKY    Lee Kuan Yew – Singapore’s founding Prime Minister  
Madrasah   Islamic Religious School 
Majlis Pusat   Central Council of Malay Cultural Organizations 
MCCY   Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth 
Mendaki    Council for the Education of Muslim Children 
MHA    Ministry of Home Affairs 
MMO    Malay/Muslim Organization 
MP    Member of Parliament 
MRHA   Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act 
MRT    Mass Rapid Transit 
MUIS    Islamic Religious Council of Singapore 
Mufti    Highest religious authority in a Muslim community 
NGO    Non-governmental Organization 
Niqab    Islamic veil that is worn by some Muslim women  
NMP    Nominated Member of Parliament 
NTUC    National Trades Union Congress 
PAS    Islamic Party of Malaysia 
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PAP    People’s Action Party 
Perdaus   Muslim organization dedicated to community 
development 
Pergas    Islamic Scholars and Religious Teachers Association 
PKMS    Singapore Malay National Organization 
PSLE    Primary School Leaving Examinations 
RRG    Religious Rehabilitation Group 
SMI    Singapore Muslim Identity 
SPH    Singapore Press Holdings  
Salafism/Wahhabism Brand of Islam that focuses on literal and fundamental 
teachings of the Prophet 
Sunni    Adherent to the Ahlussunnah-wal-Jama’ah school of 
thought 
Sufism    Brand of Islam that focuses on mysticism 
Syariah   Islamic code of law 
Ulama    Muslim religious clergy 
Ummah   Muslim global community 
UMNO   United Malays National Organization 
US    United States of America 













Chapter 1: Introduction 
  The management of religion is of paramount concern for any state that 
professes to be secular. This is particularly critical in states with multi-religious and 
multi-ethnic populations. Due to the potential volatility inherent in religions, states 
have consistently sought to govern religion in a bid to maintain social order. The 
Singapore state is no different; as a self-declared secular country,1 the People’s 
Action Party (PAP) government conscientiously adopts secularism as a strategy to 
ensure the perpetuation of PAP hegemony.2 Undoubtedly, Singapore has enjoyed an 
unprecedented amount of success in the maintenance of religious harmony and this is 
in no small part due to the state’s religious adherence to secularism and the values of 
multi-racialism and meritocracy.3
The state has always had a vested interest in managing Islam in particular, 
especially in light of growing Muslim extremism worldwide. Greater caution is 
exercised when dealing with Islam for numerous reasons. Firstly, due to its 
comprehensive belief systems, Islam could potentially be used as a rallying point 
against some state policies.
  
4 Secondly, the government genuinely believes that 
increased Muslim religiosity is directly correlated to increased terrorist activity.5
                                                          
1 Prime Minister’s Office, “Basic Rules for Religious Harmony,” 
 
Finally, Singaporean Muslims’ relative socio-economic backwardness in comparison 
to the other religious communities instantly provides for a potent source of discontent 
http://www.pmo.gov.sg/News/Transcripts/Prime+Minister/PM+s+4+basic+rules+for+religious+harmo
ny.htm (accessed October 10, 2011). 
2 Kenneth Paul Tan, “Pragmatic Secularism, Civil Religion, and Political Legitimacy in Singapore,” in 
State and Secularism: Perspectives from Asia, ed. Michael Heng Siam-Heng and Ten Chin Liew 
(Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2010), 341. 
3 Eugene K. B. Tan, “Keeping God in Place: The Management of Religion in Singapore,” in Religious 
Diversity in Singapore, ed. Lai Ah Eng (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies jointly with 
Institute of Policy Studies, 2008), 55. 
4 See Bruce Lincoln, Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion after September 11, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2002). 
5 Refer to founding Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew’s comments in Mike Millard, Jihad in Paradise: Islam 
and Politics in Southeast Asia (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2004), 81. 
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against the state, especially considering the nation’s geo-political and historical 
circumstances.6
 This thesis serves to investigate the brand of secularism employed by the state 
in managing religion in Singapore. The focus is on Islam. Despite acknowledging the 
various understandings of the term secularism, as will be discussed later, for the 
purposes of this paper, secularism is defined as the submission of religion to the 




 The research question is chosen for a few compelling reasons. Firstly, much of 
the literature delving into secularism and the state revolves around the European and 
 The main research questions are thus: what is the PAP 
government’s approach towards Islam, what brand of secularism does it consciously 
adopt in this approach, and most importantly, why does this version of secularism 
take root. This study will analyze the actions and interactions of two Muslim 
organizations with the government to determine the nature of their relationship with 
the state. The independence, or lack thereof, of these organizations will be assessed. 
While in Singapore most analyses of secularism are state-centric, the role of agency 
(of religious leaders and organizations) will be given due consideration as well. A 
new theoretical framework is proposed, and this framework can be extended to 
comprehend the state’s relationships with the other religions. The consequences of the 
state’s attitude towards Islam will be examined. This paper intends to contribute to the 
wider theoretical literature on states and secular societies by introducing co-option 
politics into the equation. 
                                                          
6 Hussin Mutalib, “Singapore Muslims: The Quest for Identity in a Modern City-State,” Journal of 
Muslim Minority Affairs, 25 (2005): 55. 
7 I concur with the definition used by Ardic. See Nurullah Ardic, Islam and the Politics of Secularism: 
The Caliphate and Middle Eastern Modernization in the early 20th century (Abingdon, Oxon, New York: 
Routledge, 2012), 10. 
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Western experience, which may or may not concur with the Asian context.8
 Secondly, the peculiar position of Islam in Singapore warrants an exhaustive 
study of how the state deals with this religion and what the consequences of the 
strategies employed, are. This atypical position is a result of the legislative 
acknowledgement of Islam through the Administration of Muslim Law Act 
(AMLA),
 While 
there is a growing amount of research dealing with Asian experiments on secularism, 
much more needs to be done to elucidate our understanding of the competing versions 
of Asian secularism. This paper intends to contribute towards this erudition. 
9
 This study also takes on a different angle vis-a-vis existing works in two ways; 
the perceptions of the Muslim community towards the organizations that represent 
their interests, or are supposed to, are taken into consideration and literature on co-
optation politics will be used to explain the unique nature of secularism the Singapore 
state adopts. The two main Muslim organizations in Singapore, the Islamic Religious 
Council of Singapore (MUIS) and the Islamic Scholars and Religious Teachers 
Association (Pergas), due to their prominence and significance amongst the Muslims, 
will be scrutinized in depth to establish the relationship between the state and Islam in 
Singapore. A bottom-up perspective, on the active choices made by these 
 rising Islamization and the effects that accompany this phenomenon. The 
effectiveness of these strategies will be evaluated - though that is not the central focus 
– to observe if there are useful lessons for states in dealing with religion, religious 
extremism and belligerent religious elements within a society. 
                                                          
8 Prasenjit Duara, “An East Asian Perspective on Religion and Secularism,” in State and Secularism: 
Perspectives from Asia, ed. Michael Heng Siam-Heng and Ten Chin Liew (Singapore: World Scientific 
Publishing, 2010), 1. 
9 Eugene K.B. Tan, “Norming “Moderation” in an “Iconic Target”: Public Policy and the Regulation of 
Religious Anxieties in Singapore,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 19 (2007): 446.  
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organizations, is explored in addition to a top-down, statist approach. The reasons for 
the selection of these organizations will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
 This paper argues that the state adroitly administers Islam through two types 
of secularism: muscular secularism, as described by Ramakrishna (2010) and 
calibrated secularism. While muscular secularism refers to a direct, interventionist 
approach characterised by draconian measures, harsh laws and formal co-optation, 
calibrated secularism is more of an indirect form of intervention that consists of 
symbiotic relationships between the religious organization in question and the state, in 
addition to informal co-optation. The state’s relationship with MUIS is mostly that of 
muscular secularism while Pergas is managed through calibrated secularism. It will be 
demonstrated that these religious organizations allow themselves to be co-opted, thus 
emphasising critically the role of agency and the non-passive nature of the actors 
involved. A third form, liberal secularism, is not at all considered by the state to be a 
functional course of action.10 While these two approaches have worked in tandem to 
ensure social stability, and hence maintain PAP hegemony, since social order is the 
bedrock of PAP legitimacy, it must be cautioned that precedents in other countries 
have shown that if the Muslim community perceives the clergy or Muslim 
organizations to be instruments of the state, alternative claims to religious legitimacy 
(including extremist ones) might emerge.11
                                                          
10 See Kumar Ramakrishna, “”Muscular” versus “Liberal” Secularism and the Religious Fundamentalist 
Challenge in Singapore,” (RSIS Working Paper, 2010).  
 I will further argue that a move towards 
liberal secularism in some aspects will be beneficial for both the state and the 
organizations in question.  
11 John Hunwick, “Secular Power and Religious Authority in Muslim Society: The Case of Songhay,” The 
Journal of African History, 37 (1996): 177. 
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 It must be emphasised here that this thesis does not make a normative 
judgment on ‘co-optation’ as a necessarily negative (or positive) phenomenon. The 
concept of co-optation will be dissected and evaluated objectively, without judging 
whether particular organizations, in their dealings with the state, have ‘sold-out’. 
Organizations which agree to be co-opted often do so with larger end goals in mind, 
and they use their position vis-à-vis the state to their own advantage too. In addition, 
co-optation must also be viewed not only as a formal mechanism, whereby states 
employ institutionalized means to co-opt organizations by making them part of the 
executive arm of the government, but co-optation also exists in far more subtle and 
sophisticated forms, where symbiotic relationships exist at an informal level. 
1.1 Secularism, the Singapore state and Islam 
 To tackle this issue, a proper understanding of secularism needs to be 
developed. Critiques and proponents of secularism alike have vociferously expressed 
disdain or support for the concept while, in fact, they are often alluding to different 
ideas. While for the purposes of this paper it is neither possible nor necessary to 
examine all the different philosophies associated with secularism, it will be useful to 
highlight the non-monolithic nature of this notion. 
 There is a spectrum of understandings of secularism, ranging from a 
compassionate attitude towards religion to utter contempt for belief in the 
supernatural.12
                                                          
12 Mike King, Secularism: The Hidden Origins of Disbelief (Cambridge: James Clarke, 2007), 11-12. 
 It is precisely because of this variety of opinions that makes it 
necessary to explore the version of secularism adopted by the Singapore state. The 
ambiguity of secularism can be attributed to the differing experiences that Western 
states went through in their histories of separating the Church from the state and the 
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subsequent attempts by non-Western states to implement this Western-originated 
idea.13 French secularism, British secularism,14 Turkish secularism15 and even 
Chinese secularism all represent contending ideas.16
 According to Charles Taylor, there are three types of secularism. First is the 
frequently quoted definition of secularism, the separation of religion from politics or 
the public arena, or in the Western context, the separation of the church and state. 
Second, secularism might refer to the diminished importance of religious beliefs and 
religion. Third, secularism could mean the replacement of religion with substitute 
belief systems.
 I argue in the same vein that a 
distinct version of ‘Singapore secularism’ exists. 
17 Religion still plays a fundamental role in the lives of most 
Singaporeans and thus, the second and third propositions do not hold. The secularism 
practised in Singapore is most akin to the first type mentioned by Taylor; however, 
even here there are caveats. While religion is officially supposed to be separate from 
politics, the state indulges in a fair bit of intervention as and when it deems necessary. 
Hence the Singapore version of secularism barely fits into any of Taylor’s three 
categories in spite of Singapore politicians’ constant rhetoric that religion must be 
kept separate from politics.18
 The state’s ostensible desire to separate religion from politics encounters two 
major problems in its dealings with the Muslim community. Firstly, the notion of 
 
                                                          
13 Nader Hashemi, Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory for Muslim 
Societies (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 104-105. 
14Ibid., 112-113.  
15 See Hakan Yakuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press). 
16 Michael Heng Siam-Heng, “The Secular State and Its Challenges,” in State and Secularism: 
Perspectives from Asia, ed. Michael Heng Siam-Heng and Ten Chin Liew (Singapore: World Scientific 
Publishing, 2010), 27. 
17 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), 1-22. Also refer to 
Hashemi, Islam, Secularism and Liberal Democracy, 106-107. 
18 Ramakrishna, “Muscular Secularism”, 9. 
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secularism is a problematic one to be reconciled with Islamic beliefs. The idea that 
anything, including politics, can be separated from Islamic doctrine is contrary to the 
fundamental creed of Muslims that Islam encompasses every facet of life.19 Hence 
relegating Islam to a privatized sphere would not be readily accepted by Muslims. As 
any Muslim will say, Islam is not merely a religion, but rather, it is a way of life. 
Muslim intellectuals have long argued against secularism and have articulated their 
fear that reducing Islam to a private sphere is not only against the teachings of Islam, 
but will eventually render Islam unimportant. Pertinently for this paper, many 
Singaporean Muslims share this belief regarding the all-encompassing nature of 
religion in their lives.20
 This is further compounded by the negative connotations secularism entails; 
secularism is thought by many Muslims to be a Western construct that is not 
applicable to the Asian or Islamic experience.
 
21 Asad argues that the term secularism 
was concocted by English atheists to avoid being labelled with derogatory terms such 
as “infidels”.22  Such an unflattering view of the “secular” is not uncommon amongst 
the Muslim populace. An extreme example of rejection of this secular concept would 
be the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a Muslim terrorist group that militates for the 
establishment of an Islamic state to replace the secular order in Southeast Asia.23
                                                          
19 Lily Zubaidah Rahim, “Governing Islam and Regulating Muslims in Singapore’s Secular Authoritarian 
State,” (Perth: Asia Research Centre Working Paper, 2009). 
 
While most Muslims do not subscribe to this extremist ideology, their predisposition 
against secularism is a cause for concern if not carefully managed.  
20 Kamaludeen Mohamed Nasir, Alexius A. Pereira and Bryan S. Turner, Muslims in Singapore: Piety, 
Politics and Policies (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), 99-103. 
21 Bryan S. Turner, Religion and Modern Society: Citizenship, Secularisation and the State (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011),  133. See also Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, 
Islam, Modernity (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
22 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 23-24. 




Different Muslim communities have reacted varyingly to secularism. Turkey 
exhibits what perhaps bears the closest resemblance to Western versions of 
secularism, though even this appears to be changing since Tayyip Erdogan’s Adalet 
ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) was voted into power in 2002.24 In Malaysia the Islamic 
Party of Malaysia (PAS) was formed to democratically challenge the secular Muslim 
ruling party. Fully aware of the appeal of Islam, the ruling United Malays National 
Organization (UMNO) declared Malaysia to be an Islamic state in 2001 to give itself 
some form of religious legitimacy amongst the electorate, despite the constitution’s 
secular declaration.25 The Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that comprised 
Islamic scholars, made replacing the secular Egyptian order with the primacy of 
Islamic law and beliefs their utmost priority since its founding in 1928.26
 The second problem is of a practical one; as Muslims clamour for religious 
rights in Singapore, it is almost inevitable that their demands will bring them to 
venture into the political arena. When a Muslim community asks for the right to adorn 
the Muslim headscarf (hijab) for the female students in national schools or in the 
uniformed groups, for example, it is highly probable that they have to enter the 
political sphere to do so, either through elected officials pursuing this cause in 
legislative assemblies or (Muslim) civil society groups pressurising the government. 
This is not likely to be tolerated in authoritarian settings. Even in liberal democracies 
 These 
examples highlight the precarious nature of the relationships between Muslim 
communities and secular states. 
                                                          
24 Hakan Yakuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), 1. 
25 Johan Saravanamuttu, “Malaysia: Multicultural Society, Islamic State or What?” in State and 
Secularism: Perspectives from Asia, ed. Michael Heng Siam-Heng and Ten Chin Liew (Singapore: World 
Scientific Publishing, 2010), 279-289. 
26 Adnan A. Musallam, From Secularism to Jihad: Syed Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism, 
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2005), 7. 
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that are staunchly secular, like France, the act of covering the face with a niqab (the 
veil) is considered to be against French values and is disallowed.27 This is because as 
Ibrahim Abraham argues, the national secular identity is being challenged by the 
desire to put on Muslim headgear.28 The authoritarian leanings of the PAP 
government is well-documented29 and just like any overtly secular state, it has been 
known to have a disdain against forays into the public space by zealous religious 
figures or groups. The ‘Marxist Conspiracy’ is a prime example; the state arrested 
several members of the Catholic Church in 1987-88 for allegedly being involved in 
plots to overthrow the state, even though till today, no concrete evidence has been 
adduced.30 The government’s no-hijab31 policy has been upheld since independence 
and despite pressures by certain quarters in the early 2000s to overturn this, the PAP 
has stood firm.32 The PAP defends this stubbornness by arguing that allowing the 
hijab to be worn will cause the national identity to wither as it will inhibit social 
integration.33 Consistent with their authoritarian tendencies, senior PAP leaders 
castigated the four parents who, in acts of defiance, sent their children to the national 
schools donning the hijab. Then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong publicly vilified 
Zulfikar Shariff, a man who had led calls for the government to lift the ban on the 
hijab in national schools, calling his ideas “extreme” and “corrosive”.34
                                                          
27 “The War of French Dressing,” The Economist, January 14, 2010. 
 When the 
Association of Muslim Professionals (AMP) was formed and began to project itself as 
28 Ibrahim Abraham, “Hijab in an Age of Fear: Security, Secularism and Human Rights,” Australian 
Religious Studies Review, 19 (2006): 170. 
29 Hussin Mutalib, Parties and Politics: A Study of Opposition Parties and the PAP in Singapore 
(Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003), 3. 
30 Daniel P.S Goh, “State and Social Christianity in Post-Colonial Singapore,” Journal of Social Issues in 
Southeast Asia, 25 (2010): 56. 
31 Hijab is an Islamic headscarf that is obligatory, according to Islamic jurisprudence, for Muslim 
females to adorn. 
32 Rahim, “Governing Islam,” 15-16. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Mutalib, “Singapore Muslims,” 63 and Millard, Jihad in Paradise, 80-88. 
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an alternative leadership to the PAP Muslim Members of Parliament (MPs) that 
would pursue the rights of the Muslim community, Goh chided them in no uncertain 
terms for stepping into the political arena, reasoning that their actions would only 
weaken the PAP Malay leadership and the community in the long term.35
1.2 The Muslim Community; Problems, Aspirations and  Assertion 
 Goh’s 
riposte against AMP was a manifestation of the dilemma that arose for the Muslim 
community and is still relevant today: how can they articulate their demands and 
pursue their rights without being accused of encroaching upon the political space and 
hence, violating Singapore’s sacred secular policy? This dilemma evidently poses a 
possible area of conflict between Muslims and the secular state.  
Muslims number about 550 000 of the total population of 3.77 million, 
amounting to roughly 15% of the citizen population.36 Most of them are Malay by 
ethnicity, to the point that ‘Malay’ and ‘Muslim’ are terms often used interchangeably 
in the context of Singapore, despite the existence of Muslims of Indian, Arab and 
other origins. Lily Zubaidah Rahim asserts that in Singapore, the Muslim and Malay 
identities are “conflated”.37
                                                          
35 Hussin Mutalib, “Constructing a Constructive Opposition,” in Impressions of the Goh Chok Tong 
Years in Singapore, eds. Bridget Welsh, James Chin, Arun Mahizhnan and Tan Tarn How (Singapore: 
NUS Press, 2009), 68. Also see Chua Beng Huat and Kwok Kian-Woon, “Social Pluralism in Singapore,” 
in The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, ed. 
Robert W. Hefner (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001), 86-118. 
 The Malays (and hence Muslims) have not fared 
particularly well in the socio-economic sphere; in terms of education and economics 
especially, the Malays have consistently lagged behind the other two major races in 
Singapore, the Chinese and Indians, as evidenced by the median income and 
36 Singapore Department of Statistics, “Singapore Population Census 2010, Statistical Release 1,” 10.  
http://www.singstat.gov.sg/pubn/popn/C2010sr1/cop2010sr1.pdf. (accessed 17 October , 2011).   
37 Rahim, “Governing Islam,” 3. 
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university enrolment statistics in 2010.38 The gaps between the Malays and the other 
communities have persisted to the point that Lee Kuan Yew expressed his sombre 
view that Malays will never reach the level of progress of the other communities.39
 Politically, it appears superficially that the Malays/Muslims are adequately 
represented.  Roughly 14% or 12 of the 87 elected Members of Parliament are 
Malays/Muslims, similar to the proportion of Muslims in Singapore.
 
40 The Group 
Representation Constituency (GRC) system ensures that the minority communities 
(Malays and Indians) will always have elected representatives.41 However the claim 
that Muslims in Singapore are politically well-represented falls short on two points. 
Firstly, segments of the Muslim community have long contended that the PAP 
Muslim MPs do not articulate Malay/Muslim aspirations enough and are often just 
lackeys of the state. This sentiment was held so strongly by many quarters within the 
community that AMP was set up organically, to provide alternative voices for the 
community.42
                                                          
38 Singapore Population Census, “Singapore Population Census 2010, Statistical Release 2,“ 10, 13. 
 Secondly, there has been a lack of Malay/Muslim representation in the 
key decision-making areas. Since independence, there have only been four Muslim 
ministers and not more than one in every cabinet. These four ministers have also 
never held any of the major portfolios and have instead been reduced to a supporting 
role by being in-charge of the relatively less-important ministries: no Malay Minister 
has ever been entrusted with the Defence, Finance, Education, Foreign and Home 
Affairs portfolios. The political insignificance of the Malays has been highlighted by 
http://www.singstat.gov.sg/pubn/popn/C2010sr2/cop2010sr2.pdf. (accessed 17 October, 2011). 
39 Zuraidah Ibrahim et al., Lee Kuan Yew : Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going (Singapore: Straits 
Times Press, 2011). 
40 Parliament of Singapore, “List of Current MPs.” http://www.parliament.gov.sg/list-of-current-mps 
(accessed October 17, 2011).   
41 Hussin Mutalib, “Constitutional-Electoral Reforms and Politics in Singapore,” Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, 27 (2002): 665. 
42 Chua Beng Huat, “Multiculturalism in Singapore: An Instrument of Social Control,” Race and Class, 
44 (2003): 66. 
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political commentators within the Muslim community since the early years of 
independence.43 Razali’s claim that the presence of a Malay minister is only to 
portray the image of a multi-racial PAP leadership might hold some truth when 
weighed against these facts.44 This is in direct contrast to the other minority 
community, the Indians; in the current cabinet alone, there are four ministers of Indian 
descent (or who have partial Indian parentage), one of whom is the Deputy Prime 
Minister.45
The issue of Muslims in the Singapore Armed Forces continues to be a sore 
point in relations between the community and the state. Senior PAP leaders have 
unequivocally stated that Malay/Muslims are disallowed from holding top positions in 
the military solely on the basis of their race and religion.
 They have also been entrusted with the more important portfolios 
including Finance and Education.  
46 This predicament is 
indicative of a more serious situation; until Malays/Muslims are accepted as equals in 
the military, they are hardly considered as full-fledged citizens. Military theorists 
have always believed that the exclusion of a particular ethnic minority from the army 
reflects the state’s perception that the said minority are not true ‘citizens’ of the 
nation.47
                                                          
43 Yang Razali Kassim, “Education and the Malays in Singapore: 1959-1979.” (Honours Thesis, National 
University of Singapore, 1980), 15. 
 Naturally, this unequal social, economic and political playing field, whether 
perceived or real, is an inherent source of dissatisfaction within the Muslim 
community. While the state espouses meritocracy as the bedrock of society, there are 
both subtle and unconcealed forms of prejudice on the part of the ruling elite. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Mr Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Dr Vivian Balakrishnan, Mr K. Shanmugam and Mr S. Iswaran. 
46 Eugene Tan, “Keeping God in Place,” 60-61. 
47 Ronald Krebs, Fighting for Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship, (Thaca: Cornell 
University Press), 30-31. 
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 Constitutionally, the Malays are recognized as the indigenous people of the 
land and the government has an explicit duty to “safeguard, support, foster and 
promote their political, educational, religious, economic, social and cultural interests 
and the Malay language.”48 Malay is the national language of Singapore and the 
national anthem is sung in Malay, though this is purely a product of historical 
circumstances.49 This special position of the Malays/Muslims is further enhanced by 
the fact that there is a Cabinet position for the Minister of Muslim Affairs, a privilege 
that is not given to other religious communities, and the existence of MUIS which 
serves to “advise” the government and President on affairs pertaining to the Muslim 
community.50
The geopolitical realities cannot be ignored by the state, for Singapore is a 
Chinese-dominated country in a predominantly Malay/Muslim region. Its history and 
proximity with neighbouring Malaysia adds another dimension to this dynamics. The 
indelible scars left by the racial riots that occurred between the Malays and Chinese 
when it was part of the Malaysian Federation,
  
51 together with Malaysian leaders’ 
constant claims that Singapore Malays are marginalized and need to stand up for their 
rights,52
                                                          
48 Singapore Constitution, Article 152. 




A%22constitution%22;rec=0 (accessed 17 October, 2011). 
49 Mutalib, “Singapore Muslims,” 55. 




A%22constitution%22;rec=0 (accessed 18 October, 2011). 
51 Albert Lau, A Moment of Anguish: Singapore in Malaysia and the Politics of Disengagement 
(Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998),  161-165. 
52 Dr Mahathir is the best example of this. Refer to his blog entry,” Malaysia According to LKY,” 




Singaporean Muslims. Proximity with Malaysia and Indonesia inadvertently results in 
the fear of the possible spreading of ‘problematic’ ideologies to the local Muslims. 
For example, the Islamization policies of Dr Mahathir and Suharto in their respective 
countries generated genuine fear on the PAP’s part that Singaporean Muslims would 
aspire for greater Islamization as well.53
It is common to find ethnic and religious minorities harbouring political, social 
and economic aspirations within the confines of their societies. These aspirations 
could range from a benign recognition of its distinct identity by the state to complete 
autonomy or separation.
  
54 In most cases, a minority group feels aggrieved that they 
have not been accorded a proper share of national benefits.55 This minority group 
assertion seems to be a global phenomenon, especially with the spread of liberal-
democratic values which embolden minorities to demand for greater space, and 
Southeast Asia is an embodiment of this complex range of aspirations. While Chinese 
in Malaysia seek to attain more rights through participation in state processes (the 
formation of Chinese-based parties to further their causes), Muslims in Southern 
Thailand seek greater autonomy and some claim, independence from the state.56
                                                          
53 Rahim, “Governing Islam,” 12. 
 In 
Singapore, there is ample evidence of Muslim minority assertiveness and this has 
been grudgingly admitted by various PAP leaders. Although there have been 
numerous illustrations of Muslim assertion in Singapore and it will not be possible to 
discuss all of them, it will be instructive to expound on a few of these manifestations.  
54 Martin W. Mikesell and Alexander B. Murphy, “A Framework for Comparative Study of Minority 
Group Assertions,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 81 (1991): 581. 
55 Ibid., 582. 
56 John Funston, Southern Thailand: The Dynamics of Conflict (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2008), 20-21. 
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Of vital concern to the government is Muslims’ rising identification with the 
issues of the ummah, or fellow Muslims, and their increasing prevalent view that they 
are part of a global Islamic community.57 Of late, there have been increasing 
commentaries and letters to the forum of the only Malay-language newspaper (Berita 
Harian), in Singapore, including by this author, on the issue of Palestine (a rallying 
point for Muslims everywhere) and the Arab Spring.58 In 2003, after the US invasion 
of Iraq which was condemned by most quarters throughout the world, many mosques 
in Singapore performed a special supplication for Iraqi civilians during some of the 
obligatory prayers for Muslims.59 This identification with the ummah could prove 
problematic for the state: it could result in the withering of the authority of the 
government on its Muslim citizens as their loyalties might be directed to their 
religious cause that transcends nation-state boundaries. Consequentially, Muslims 
might disregard national interests (as understood by the government) in favour of 
concerns of the ummah. A manifestation of this conflict of interests was when the 
visit of Israeli President, Chaim Herzog, was opposed by many Muslims. While Israel 
has been a long-standing ally of Singapore due to the military assistance it rendered 
since the latter’s independence, it is frowned upon in the Muslim world due to its 
treatment of the Palestinians.60
                                                          
57 Eugene Tan, “Keeping God in Place,” 60. 
 The differing perceptions held in this instance by the 
state and the Muslims brought the issue of state-versus-religion loyalty to the fore and 
provided for an uncomfortable situation for the Muslims: while in principle most of 
them support the Palestinian cause, the secular state demands that loyalty to the nation 
58 Refer to Walid Jumblatt Abdullah, “Rancangan Suria berat sebelah (Suria documentary was one-
sided),” Berita Harian, 1 April 2012 and “Dunia Arab terus alami pergolakan dan perubahan (Arab 
World continues to experience turmoil and change),” Berita Harian, 29 December 2011. 
59 This supplication is known as Qunut Nazilah. 
60 Alex Josey, Lee Kuan Yew: The Struggle for Singapore (London: Angus & Robertson, 1980), 316-317. 
16 
 
must come before all other affiliations and national interests must be prioritised above 
all else.  
Many other expressions of the Muslims’ identity assertion have surfaced. 
After the 2011 elections, there were calls for the only Malay minister to be 
“promoted” and for more Malay MPs to be given ministerial positions.61 This could 
possibly reveal Malay desires to be play greater roles in the nation’s political 
processes. Mutalib mentions the community’s rejection of proposed changes to the 
Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) and the disgruntlement of Muslims 
towards the government’s no-hijab policy as other examples.62 More recent evidences 
of this assertion of identity would include the establishment of more part-time Islamic 
schools,63 the organic establishment of organizations by Muslim undergraduates to 
help full-time madrasah students with their academic examinations64 and the uproar 
over Lee Kuan Yew’s disparaging comments about Malays and Muslims in Hard 
Truths.65 The latter is perhaps most revealing since it is not the first time such 
comments have been made by the senior Lee yet never before had so negative a 
response been generated that he consequently had to revise his statement saying that 
he “stood corrected”.66
                                                          
61 Refer to Zailani Yusof, “Semoga AP Melayu diberi lebih peluang (May the Malay MPs be given more 
opportunities),” Berita Harian, 18 May 2011. 
 
62 Mutalib, “Singapore Muslims,” 57. 
63 Two such institutions are Andalus and Al-Zuhri. 
64 Two of these organizations are Ace PSLE Exams and Aspire and Achieve through Mentorship. Refer 
to Stacey Chua, “Old girl helps to spur Islamic School,” The Straits Times, December 10 2011 and 
Nurulhuda Albukhari, “Pelajar varsity dan poly bimbing pelajar Aljunied (University and polytechnic 
students help Madrasah Aljunied students),” Berita Harian, 2 June 2009. 
65 Refer to “MM’s remarks on integration draw flak,” The Straits Times, 26 January 2011 and 
Muhammad Haikal Mohd Harun, “Pemimpin dan badan Melayu diseru betulkan tanggapan (Leaders 
and Malay organizations urged to correct misperceptions),” Berita Harian, 29 January 2011. 
66 For examples of similar comments by Lee on the Muslim Community, refer to Tom Plate, 
Conversations with Lee Kuan Yew: Citizen Singapore: how to build a nation (Singapore: Marshall 
Cavendish Editions, 2010) and Anthony L. Smith, “Terrorism and the Political Landscape in Southeast 
Asia:  the fragile post-Bali consensus,” in Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia : transnational 
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The minority assertion displayed by the community, coupled with their socio-
economic-political plight, the special constitutional and legal privileges accorded to 
them and the geo-political conditions of the country, require the state to be ever so 
delicate in its handling of the community. As such, the state had to develop methods 
of subtlety together with its characteristically tough approach, to manage Islam. 
1.3 Methodology 
 From the outset, this author acknowledges that it is difficult to ascertain the 
existence of co-optation, especially that of an informal nature. To determine whether 
co-optation is present, three methods will be used. Firstly, the existence/absence of 
formal or symbiotic structures between the state and organizations will be 
investigated. Secondly, the actions, inactions and statements of MUIS and Pergas will 
be scrutinized to detect whether over time, there have been significant shifts in the 
orientations of these organizations in terms of their relationships with and outlook 
towards the PAP government. Finally, interviews with members of these 
organizations and a selected/representative sample of the Muslim community will be 
explored. These perceptions are valuable as the members of the organizations have an 
obvious incentive to downplay their relations with the government and to not be seen 
as instruments of the state and hence interviews with them will not suffice. To more 
accurately understand the position of these organizations, how society perceives them 
needs to be taken into account.  
As discussed earlier, this paper will attempt to explicate the nature of 
secularism in Singapore by simultaneously using a statist, top-down approach 
                                                                                                                                                                      
challenges to states and regional stability, ed. Paul J. Smith (Armonk, New York : M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 
120. For Lee’s “stood corrected” comments, refer to “Malay Integration: MM stood corrected,” The 
Straits Times, 8 March 2011. 
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together with a ‘weapons-of-the-weak’, bottom-up analysis. This will be done via the 
following ways.  
 Firstly, a review of the existing literature will be done to identify the gaps in 
explanations of state secularism. Assessing the literature will be a good starting point 
as it will better illustrate the strategies employed by the PAP in managing religion. 
Currently though, most of the existing literature employ the statist approach and 
focuses on the role of the state without giving the other agents much deliberation. 
There is also a dearth of existing work that focuses on Muslim organizations, 
particularly the ones chosen for this paper. In addition to the literature review, the 
actions, statements and laws/bills passed by the government are analyzed to determine 
its attitudes and predispositions on secularism. Precedents of state actions towards 
religion/religious movements will be dissected too. 
 In addition, interviews with the members of these organizations were 
conducted to determine the precise nature of the organizations’ worldviews.  
 Interviews and surveys with ‘significant members of the Muslim community’ 
were done to establish their perceptions of these organizations. ‘Significant members 
of the community’ are defined as politically and socially aware Muslims and those 
whom are involved with the community’s affairs. These include academics, 
professionals, members of Malay/Muslim Organizations (MMOs) and members of the 
public who are politically not apathetic. While interviews were conducted with the 
first three categories of Muslims as they can be readily identified, two levels of 
surveys were done for the members of public. The first was to identify those that are 
politically and socially conscious via general questions and once identified, the 
second round of survey questions were distributed to them. Questions in the first 
19 
 
survey include ‘which football team do you support’, ‘what are the three madrasahs 
that are under the direct purview of the government’, ‘name five of the 11 Malay PAP 
MPs’ and ‘how did you find the Youth Olympic Games to be’. Questions that are 
irrelevant to the study were included in order to induce respondents to be more 
truthful.  
 The second survey discussed in more depth the nature of the relationships 
these organizations have with the state, what the community’s expectations of these 
two organizations are and what led them to forming their respective perceptions about 
these entities. The questions were phrased, as far as possible, in a neutral, value-free 
manner so as to eliminate the “social desirability bias” since respondents might not be 
entirely truthful if they are aware that the survey is aimed to determine perceptions 
(which might be negative) towards respected religious establishments.67
Survey forms were distributed at various places such as NUS, NTU and a few 
mosques throughout Singapore. In order to reduce the selection bias and ensure a 
random sample as far as possible, survey forms were also disseminated at various 
train stations in Singapore, including Tampines, Yishun, Simei, Woodlands and 
Bedok. These stations were chosen to account for differing geographical locations and 
the socio-economic profiles of the community. Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) users 
definitely represent people of a certain socio-economic profile (lower and middle-
classes) so the interviews with the Muslim professionals are pertinent in diversifying 
 The letters to 
Berita Harian’s Forum page on these organizations also proved useful, though they 
are not definitive insights. 
                                                          
67 Anton J. Nederhof, “Methods of coping with Social Desirability Bias: a Review,” European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 15 (1985): 263-280. 
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the nature of respondents (presumably, they are of the upper-middle and upper strata 
of society).  
In total, 80 survey forms were done for the first round and of these, 33 were 
selected for the second round of surveys. 28 of the 33 surveys were subsequently 
completed. 30 interviews were conducted with significant members of the Muslim 
community. The findings will be discussed in the succeeding chapters.  
1.4 Thesis Outline 
  In the next chapter, a comprehensive literature review of secularism in 
Singapore will be provided and the gaps in explaining Singapore’s version of 
secularism will be recognized. Following that, the theoretical framework that is used 
is laid out. The hypotheses that have been formulated will be developed in greater 
detail. 
 Chapter 3 will deal with MUIS specifically; its brief history, relevant 
government statements/documents on MUIS and its roles, its reactions towards major 
issues that confronted the Muslim community, public (and its own members) 
perceptions towards it, whether/why they allow themselves to be co-opted and what 
are the possible consequences. Chapter 4 will delve into the same issues for Pergas.  
 Finally, I will conclude in the final chapter by making clear the usefulness of 
this study, suggesting future areas for research and highlighting the limitations of this 





Chapter 2: The Theory 
2.1 Literature Review 
 There have been numerous academic works purporting to explain PAP 
electoral dominance in Singapore and the various strategies it has employed 
throughout the course of the city-state’s independence.68
 The strategy of co-optation is one that is extensively used by governments 
everywhere to silence dissenting voices and turn critics into adherents, and perhaps no 
regime does it more deftly than the PAP government. Either through formal or 
informal means, the PAP has managed to successfully co-opt various people or 
groups into the state mechanism and in the process, further legitimize its rule. Rodan 
argues that the Nominated Member of Parliament (NMP) scheme, a controversial 
proposal that was introduced by the PAP where members are chosen by a special 
Parliamentary select committee, displayed a form of “strategic inclusion” of different 
segments of society to ensure that the PAP maintained an advantage over the 
opposition, as the latter was no longer one of the only avenues through which citizens 
could address their concerns that the PAP MPs did not raise in Parliament.
 Inevitably, some of these 
studies have dealt with the issues of state management of religion and co-option 
politics, as these have immensely contributed to PAP preponderance. This section 
serves to examine the existing literature on co-optation and state secularism, and 
identify areas pertaining to these issues that have not been adequately explored. 
Again, co-optation need not prima facie be viewed only in negative terms; there are 
often multiple (and strategies on both sides) for this mode of state-social group 
relations.  
69
                                                          
68 See Rodan (2009), Mutalib (2003, 2012), Rahim (2009).  
 Then-
69 Garry Rodan, “New Modes of Political Participation and Singapore’s Nominated Members of 
Parliament,” Government and Opposition, 44 (2009): 442.  
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Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong admitted as much, when he expressed hope 
that oppositional support would decline with the introduction of this new scheme.70
 Mutalib notes that in 1988, the Majlis Pusat, the umbrella body for Malay-
Muslim organizations in Singapore, had made some bold recommendations to the 
government. However, soon after, the secretary-general of the Majlis Pusat was 
removed and replaced by a PAP Malay MP and the organization ceased to be as 
critical as it had been before, and instead pandered to state inclinations.
 
The scheme was a structure introduced to formalize political co-option.  
71 Rahim goes 
one step further in declaring that the PAP’s dependence on co-option has 
“emasculated” civic society,72 and she gives a substantial list of Malay leaders who 
have been co-opted.73
 The more renowned examples of the strategy of co-optation involve the media, 
trade unions and grassroots organizations, or as termed by some scholars, the “para-
political institutions.” These entities have been systematically and purposefully co-
opted by the state such that they serve as partners in nation-building, and not the roles 
that they traditionally fulfil in other parts of the world. The government has been 
unapologetically frank about its grip over the grassroots organizations. Then-Minister 
of Home Affairs Wong Kan Seng publicly declared that the government had every 
right to use the People’s Association, the umbrella body for all grassroots 
organizations in Singapore, in order to propagate citizens’ support for the PAP, much 
 She goes as far as hinting that even AMP, an organization that 
was set up to challenge the PAP Malay leadership, has successfully been co-opted 
into the state mechanism. 
                                                          
70 Ibid., 444. 
71 Hussin Mutalib, “The Singapore Minority Dilemma,” Asian Survey, 51 (2011): 1161. 
72 Lily Zubaidah Rahim, The Singapore Dilemma: The Political and Educational Marginality of the 
Malay Community (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1998), 35. 
73 Ibid., 96. 
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to the chagrin of the opposition parties, whose elected MPs are denied access to these 
organizations.74
 Trade unions in Singapore have generally been ineffectual and have not been 
performing the role of an independent entity whose sole objective is the protection of 
workers’ rights. Indeed, the National Trade Unions Congress (NTUC), the over-
arching network for the trade unions in Singapore, has a special relationship with the 
state such that its first priority must be to contribute to national development.
 
75 The 
Secretary-General of the NTUC is often a PAP Minister, highlighting not only the 
symbiotic relationship between the state and the trade unions, but also the degree to 
which NTUC has been co-opted.76 That state interests must always be articulated by 
the NTUC ahead of workers’ interests, is testament to this. NTUC’s rallying call has 
always been for trade unions to “discard their narrow self-interest” and instead 
accommodate, not confront, the government.77
 The mass media perhaps represents the most potent form of a co-opted entity, 
in terms of promulgating PAP interests.
 
78 A number of disparaging terms such as the 
“running dogs of the government” has been coined to describe the media in Singapore 
but what warrants more attention is not only the public statements made by the upper 
echelons of the PAP leadership with regards to why the media must serve state 
interests, and these have been well-documented,79
                                                          
74 Refer to “PA deputy head defends its links with ruling party,” The Straits Times, 22 March, 2003. 
 but also, the profiles of those who 
75 Mutalib, Parties and Politics, 293. 
76 The current  Secretary-General of NTUC is Lim Swee Say. 
77 Yong Mun Cheong, “The Political Structures of the Independent States,” in The Cambridge History 
of Southeast Asia: The nineteenth and twentieth Centuries, Vol. 2, ed. Nicholas Tarling (Cambridge, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 452. 
78 For a more detailed discussion on the state control of the media, see Cherian George, Contentious 
Journalism and the Internet: Towards Democratic Discourse in Malaysia and Singapore (Singapore: 
Singapore University Press, 2006), 42-54. 
79 Refer to Terence Lee, The Media, Cultural Control and Government in Singapore (Abingdon, Oxon, 
New York: Routledge, 2010). 
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have held the important portfolios in the media industry. The current chairman of 
Singapore Press Holdings (SPH) is Dr Lee Boon Yang, a former PAP member who 
held several high-profile ministerial portfolios and prior to that, senior government 
officials or ministers such as SR Nathan and Dr Tony Tan have held the chairmanship 
of SPH.80 SPH publishes virtually every print newspaper in Singapore except for 
TODAY, which is published by MediaCorp and even then, SPH owns part of 
MediaCorp.81
While these are not examples of religious co-optation per se, they nevertheless 
demonstrate that co-option is a purposeful approach of the state in its desire to secure 
any political advantage and to minimize opposition to its rule, be it in the form of 
formal opposition parties or in the form of non-partisan groups and figures that 
challenge state ideas. They also illustrate a vital point, that there exist different types 
of co-option strategies for the PAP: firstly, co-opting potentially dissenting 
individuals into state entities and secondly, putting government officials or trusted 
lieutenants of the PAP in charge of important institutions. I will argue that there are 
more methods of co-optation that have been employed by the state, especially in the 
realm of religion, where arguably, more nuanced methods are needed considering the 
sensitivities involved.  
   
Several authors have discussed the concept of secularism and state 
management of religion directly. A variety of terminologies has been conjured to 
characterize the nature of secularism in Singapore: “quasi-secularism”, 
“accommodative secularism”, “pragmatic secularism”, “strategic secularism”, 
amongst others. While the various terminologies might ultimately reflect a squabble 
                                                          





over semantics, it will be instructive to explore the usage of each term, to fully grasp 
the literature on the Singapore state’s administration (and control) of religion.  
Perhaps the most comprehensive works done on the Singapore brand of 
secularism have been by Thio Li Ann and Eugene Tan. Thio (2010) delves into the 
ways by which the Singapore state allows for certain provision for the Muslim 
minority especially, either constitutionally or through practice, for example, by giving 
MUIS the authority to fine those that breach regulations concerning halal food 
certification.82 This is referred to as “pragmatic secularism” as opposed to a dogmatic 
separation of the state and religion.83 Thio also labels this as “quasi-secularism” or 
“accommodative secularism”;84 all three terms essentially refer to the phenomenon of 
the self-declared secular state making exceptions and provisions for the Muslim 
minority. She views this resolute strategy of the government in a positive light, as 
according to her, it “reflects the Singapore Government’s commitment to fostering 
respect for important religious practices and safeguarding the interests of minorities in 
Singapore.”85
                                                          
82 Halal refers to things that are permissible in accordance with Islamic law, including but not 
exclusive to, food. 
 Ultimately, this move is not borne out of ideological concerns but rather 
pragmatic ones that are geared towards racial and religious harmony, by ensuring that 
no one religion gets to dominate the public sphere in Singapore and yet at the same 
time, no minority religious group feels aggrieved enough such that hatred between the 
races/religions could easily foster. This, of course, stems from the worldview of the 
83 Thio Li-Ann, “Constitutional Accommodation of the Rights of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in 
Plural Democracies: Lessons and Cautionary Tales from South-East Asia,” Pace International Law 
Review,  22 (2010): 89-91. 
84 Thio Li-Ann, “Control, Co-optation and Co-operation: Managing Religious Harmony in Singapore’s 
multi-ethnic, quasi-secular state,” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, 33 (2005): 200. 
85 Thio, “Minorities in Plural Democracies,” 89-90. 
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government that religion is a cause of conflict and strife, and hence needs to be 
consciously, and conscientiously, managed.86
Religion, according to Thio, is managed through three ways; co-optation, 
where the state harnesses the potential of religion as a moral compass for the end of 
nation-building via the religious education curriculum, co-operation, where the state 
partakes in religious activities that they deem permissible and control, where the PAP 
uses both formal (harsh, draconian laws) and informal (such as the non-legally 
binding Declaration on Religious Harmony (DRH), introduced to sketch the 
parameters of religious behaviour) methods.
  
87
While Thio does comprehensively lay out the legal framework for state 
management of religion, I believe three aspects were not dealt with sufficiently. 
Firstly, Thio seems uncritically accepting of the state’s version of secularism and does 
not consider its negative effects. Secondly, while she mentions the co-optation of 
religion by the state, she does not expound on the different types of co-optation that 
the state have been known to employ, apart from the introduction of religious 
education in national schools. Thirdly, there was neither adequate evidence nor 
explanations for the phenomenon of co-optation; exactly which religious 
organizations have been co-opted and how/why that occurs.  
  
According to Tan (2011), the state mobilizes both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law to keep 
religion in check.88
                                                          
86 Thio, “Managing Religious Harmony in Singapore,” 209-210.  
 While hard law is enshrined in Singapore’s legal system, 
including the Internal Security Act (ISA) and the Maintenance of Religious Harmony 
Act (MRHA), soft law would be “processes that attempt to set rules, ….. that may 
87 Ibid., 219-252. 
88 Refer to Eugene K.B. Tan, “Keeping Politics and Religion Separate in the Public Sphere: Managed 
Pluralism and the Regulatory State in Singapore,” in The Politics of Religion in South and Southeast 
Asia, ed. Ishtiaq Ahmed (Abingdon, Oxon, New York: 2011). 
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have regulative, practical effects similar to hard law.”  Tan identifies two soft law 
instruments, the DRH and the Singapore Muslim Identity (SMI) project.89 The latter, 
an initiative by MUIS, seeks to outline the attributes required to make good Muslims, 
while being contributing and loyal Singaporeans at the same time. The combination of 
hard and soft law instruments result in ‘pragmatic secularism,’ where the government 
does not subscribe to the “watertight” separation of the state and religion for two 
reasons: one, it is not possible to do so and two, religion is recognized to have the 
potential to contribute towards nation-building and the government would not pass 
upon a chance to do so if opportunity presented itself.90
The inadequacies of Thio’s articles, I believe, apply to Tan’s as well. In 
addition, while he argues that MUIS’ SMI is a ‘soft law’ instrument,
  
91
Rahim’s (2009) analysis was less flattering of the PAP. She introduced the 
term “strategic secularism”, to describe the state’s inconsistencies in advocating for 
secularism on the one hand, while indulging in the “intermeshing” of religion and 
politics on the other.
 he did not 
expound on MUIS’ role vis-à-vis the state and the nature of their relationship. The 
role of the agency of MUIS was ignored in this assessment.  
92
                                                          
89 Ibid., 208-209. 
 The term ‘strategic’, as opposed to ‘pragmatic’, implies some 
degree of political manoeuvring and manipulation. She proposes that the state intrudes 
on the religious domain as and when it deems necessary, in order to strengthen its grip 
on power. “Strategic secularism” is achieved by using religion to fulfil nation-
building objectives, such as the introduction of religious education into the national 
schools’ curriculum, the enactment of laws such as AMLA to govern the affairs of 
90 Ibid., 203-204. 
91 Nevertheless, I concur with him on the use of the SMI as a ‘soft law’ instrument. 
92 Rahim, “Governing Islam,” 4.  
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Muslims and the co-optation of MUIS, whereby they have to cater to the “interests of 
the state” and not the community.93 This is in addition to the callous laws the PAP has 
in place to clamp down on any activities that are deemed to be threats to peace and 
order, such as the ‘Marxist Conspiracy.’ The state conveniently uses secularism as an 
excuse, Rahim asserts, to deny demands by the Muslim community to allow students 
in national schools to don the hijab, when they had no concrete arguments against the 
efficacy of doing so.94
While her article is a useful starting point and does seem to expose the state’s 
inconsistency in its practice of secularism, there are many issues that are not 
adequately addressed; again, MUIS is assumed to be a co-opted and non-independent 
entity by virtue of its statutory board status, though no further evidences were 
adduced. This needs to be probed further, for despite being a statutory board, it could 
hypothetically be possible that the Mufti (the highest religious authority in Singapore) 
has complete independence to issue edicts that do not conform to state desires. It also 
warrants scrutiny as to whether MUIS allows itself to be co-opted, and whether it has 
a choice in the first place. Interestingly, Rahim mentions a statement by the Pergas 
President that the organization has to be the “moral anchor” for the community 
because MUIS cannot do so, but does not explore Pergas’ actions in a deeper sense; is 
Pergas really able to serve as the counter to MUIS in standing up for the rights of the 
Muslim community, or have they themselves been co-opted? She does, however, 
critically analyze the negative impact of such a rendition of secularism; something 
 She paints a bleak picture for the future of religious harmony 
in Singapore as she believes that the Muslim community is further marginalized due 
to the state’s continued “policing” of the Muslim community, under the guise of 
secularism.  
                                                          
93 Ibid., 5. 
94 Ibid., 16. 
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that was not done by the other two authors. I hope to expand on these effects, while 
acknowledging the positives highlighted by the latter two.  
Mutalib (2012) discusses the co-optation of both MUIS and Pergas, though for 
the latter, the term co-option is not used and instead, he states that Pergas has “been 
increasingly perceived by many to be close to the establishment.”95 His book 
attempted to provide a comprehensive overview of the situation confronting Malays 
in Singapore. While the closeness of Pergas to the state was mentioned on a few 
occasions, the matter was not the focus of any of the chapters. This paper builds on 
this observation in greater detail.96
Ramakrishna (2010) introduced the concept of “muscular” secularism. He 
identifies two forms of secularism, “liberal” secularism being the other one, and 
asserts that the Singapore government utilizes muscular secularism to cope with 
religious fundamentalism and does not seem likely to move towards liberal 
secularism. Muscular secularism is defined as an interventionist approach on the part 
of the state, be it through repressive laws or initiatives to prod religious and racial 
integration, such as the Ethnic Integration Policy (EIP) in public housing and the 
Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles (IRCCs) that were set up to promote 
inter-religious engagement in the wake of the September 11 attacks in New York; it 
was feared that those attacks would generate mistrust amongst the religious 
communities here, particularly mistrust against the Muslims.
 
97
                                                          
95 Hussin Mutalib, Singapore Malays: Being Ethnic Minority and Muslim in a Global City-State 
(Abingdon, Oxon, New York: 2012), 93. 
  His account of 
muscular secularism includes the examples of state intrusion into the religious domain 
given by the other previously mentioned authors.  
96 The book was released close to the deadline of the submission of this paper and hence could not be 
used as a major theoretical reference point. 
97 Ramakrishna, “Muscular Secularism,” 9-13. 
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However, Ramakrishna does not identify or elaborate on co-optation of 
specific religious organizations or personalities in his framework. Moreover, much 
like the other authors, the study of Singapore’s style of secularism takes an almost-
exclusively state-centric approach. He also does not evaluate the effects of the current 
state strategies in place, while I will argue that the state’s approach towards tackling 
religious fundamentalism might, ironically, contribute to its emergence and festering. 
A case will be made for a move towards liberal secularism, in some areas. 
This paper intends to contribute to the literature on secularism in Singapore 
via a few ways. Firstly, an elaborate model of co-optation politics will be introduced 
into the equation, whereby co-optation is understood as not only a strategy but also an 
outcome, with different types of co-optation being employed by the state (formal and 
informal). Secondly, the role of agency will be emphasised as well: the perspective of 
the personalities within the organization will be factored in, to account for why they 
are co-opted. This is also a unique feature of the study as there has been no in-depth 
study of the roles of MUIS and Pergas within the political system, despite their 
standing within the Muslim community. Thirdly, the methodology employed is 
different since how the Muslim community perceives these two organizations is 
considered. These perceptions are important as they might reveal the exact position of 
these organizations vis-à-vis the state, and they have significant consequences for 
state-society and state-religion relations in the country. Finally, the effects of these 
perceptions will be inspected, with lessons drawn from the literature on similar 





2.2 Theoretical Framework 
 To formulate the main theory for this paper, I have tweaked Ramakrishna’s 
model by expanding on his definitions of muscular secularism and adding a third type. 
This is done by drawing upon three main pieces of literature; co-optation politics by 
Saward, James Scott’s weapons of the weak and Abdullah Saeed’s work on 
legitimizing the nation-state through the co-optation of the ulama.98
 As stated earlier, Ramakrishna focuses on the state in assessing the nature of 
secularism. Muscular secularism refers to the constant need for “prodding” on the part 
of the government to cope with religious “fundamentalism,”
 
99 understood to be a 
threat to the multi-racial and multi-religious fabric of Singapore society. The prodding 
includes legislation and government-introduced/supported organizations, such as the 
IRCCs. The actions of the state have been geared towards other faiths, not just Islam, 
as was the case in the late 1980s where certain Christian quarters were alleged to have 
been proselytizing aggressively.100 Muscular secularism also refers to the suppressive 
measures taken against individuals that are perceived to be stirring anti-government 
sentiments via the usage of religious doctrine, as evinced in the state’s reaction 
towards Zulfikar. He had openly criticized the PAP’s decision to disallow Muslim 
students to don the hijab, arguing that the state had intruded upon the religious space 
of the Muslim community. He even questioned Singapore’s close foreign relations 
with the US and Israel, citing them as the main reason for the rise of Muslim 
extremism in Singapore.101
                                                          
98 Ulama are the Muslim religious clergy/scholars. See Saeed (2003). 
 The state responded swiftly in typical fashion; PAP 
99 This is a contentious term that warrants further discussion. I am just reproducing this term as used 
by Ramakrishna, despite not being entirely comfortable with its usage.  
100 Ramakrishna, “Muscular Secularism,” 16. 
101 Senia Febrica, “Securitizing Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Accounting for the Varying Responses of 
Singapore and Indonesia,” Asian Survey, 50 (2010): 577-578.  
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leaders publicly chided him and urged the Muslim community to do the same, to the 
point that Zulfikar went into self-exile. This curtailment of religion may, and in many 
cases do, lead to a compromise on individual freedom and liberty, and that is 
something that the state is willing to forego in exchange for social stability. 
 Liberal Secularism on the other hand describes a market-based approach to 
ideas and religious attitudes. At the core this argument is the belief that human beings 
are rational and well-educated entities that will not easily succumb to ‘fundamentalist’ 
and extremist ideas.102 Liberals advocate the permissibility of all types of ideas to be 
articulated and believe that due to the rationality of human beings, these ideas that are 
counter-productive to mankind as a whole will be destroyed in the “marketplace of 
ideas.”103
While Ramakrishna does not mention any specific religious organizations, the 
following table is my attempt at an accurate depiction of his model, using his 
definitions of ‘muscular’ and ‘liberal’ secularism. This table represents the ideal types 
of these two strands of secularism and their associated characteristics. 
 This will ensure that no religion gets the upper hand in the public sphere, 
and yet at the same time, individual rights and freedoms are guaranteed and not 
infringed upon. The state has a minimal role in nudging religious harmony as these 
liberals argue that the form of religious tolerance that ensues from state interference is 
a superficial, if not artificial one, while a bottom-up form of tolerance, which will 




                                                          
102 Ramakrishna, “Muscular Secularism,” 15. 




  Ramakrishna’s Two Types of Secularism 
Strategy Employed Features Organization(s) Involved 
Muscular Secularism • Direct, Interventionist 
approach 
• Tough legislation 
• Constant interference in 
the realm of religious 
affairs 
All religious organizations 
in Singapore, including 
MUIS and Pergas 
 
Liberal Secularism • Minimal/no interference 
from state  
• Allows for open 
discussion (and hence 
criticisms) of religious 
ideas 
• Protects individual 
liberties; right to 
practice/spread religion 
is always respected 
None 
Source: Ramakrishna (2010). 
This model is a useful starting point, though not without its own shortcomings. 
Firstly, it fails to account for the more nuanced, adroit and subtle methods that the 
Singapore state uses to manage religion and in the process, perpetuate its hegemony. 
Secondly, the assumption that the state is the only important actor is a flawed one. As 
James Scott would say, politically insignificant actors do not mean politically 
unimportant ones. The interactions between the state and the religious organizations, I 
reiterate, need to be studied.104
It must be noted that Ramakrishna states that the state employs this particular 
brand of secularism in order to combat religious ‘fundamentalism’ and keep it in 
check. While this is at least partially true, I argue that the nature of secularism used by 
the state serves, ultimately, to maintain PAP hegemony. This is because social and 
economic stability is the basis of the PAP’s electoral successes of the past and without 
 
                                                          
104 See James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1990). 
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religious harmony, the PAP’s reign would be immensely challenged. Ergo, the 
Singapore-styled secularism is designed to combat any form of religious extremism so 
as to maintain social stability, and hence, protect PAP rule.     
Co-optation 
There have been many competing definitions of co-optation in the 
literature,105 and unsurprisingly, most of these are accompanied by (mostly negative) 
normative judgments. To be ‘co-opted’, as commonly understood, implies ‘selling 
your soul’ to the authorities. This prevalent understanding of co-option is perhaps due 
to the term being used in Marxist critiques against the state. Marxist or left-leaning 
writers such as Gramsci and Therborn have used this term unflatteringly, usually to 
denote a strategy of the state to subordinate the masses.106
 The model of co-option as developed by Saward will be modified and used for 
this paper.
 For the purposes of this 
paper, ‘co-optation’ will be defined as an objective process (or the outcome) of the 
state working closely and harmoniously with a social/citizen group, devoid of any 
cynical judgments about whether it is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in the moral sense.  
107 Co-option refers to the incorporation of groups and/or individuals into 
state-decision making processes or apparatuses.108
                                                          
105 Throughout this paper,  ‘co-optation’ and ‘co-option’ will be used interchangeably, as is the 
practice in the literature. 
 What is perhaps most interesting 
about this model is that co-optation can manifest itself not only as an intended 
strategy, but also as an outcome. There are three types of co-optation: ideological, 
psychological and institutional. Co-optation can occur through formal mechanisms 
and arrangements or via informal means. 
106 See Goran Therborn, What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules?:State Apparatuses and State 
Power under Feudalism, Capitalism and Socialism (London, New York: Verso, 2008) and Antonio 
Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, edited and translated by Quintin 
Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, (New York: International Publishers, 1972). 
107 Michael Saward, Co-optive Politics and State Legitimacy (Aldershot [England], Brookfield: 
Dartmouth, 1992). 




 Table 2.2.2 
     Ideal-Types of Co-option 














Who is Co-opted 
 
Groups large and 
small 
Groups large and 
small 
Individuals from 
groups large and 
small 
Source: Table is reproduced from Saward (1992), Co-optive Politics, 7. 
The table above is Saward’s critique of the existing dominant views of co-
option politics. I shall elaborate on these terminologies. 
Ideological Co-option 
 This type of co-option is mainly formulated from the works of Gramsci and 
other Marxist authors. According to Gramsci, the state maintains power not just 
because of its economic prowess, but more importantly because there are ideological 
“superstructures” in place that broaden state power. Ideological domination is seen in 
a negative light and is argued to be a form of repression. Ideological co-option is then 
equivalent to the creation and sustenance of hegemony.109
 
 The subordinated are able 
to be dominated because of their acceptance of a common-belief system. Therefore, 




                                                          




Psychological co-option, according to Michels, represents a “convergence” of the 
views of the dominant class and the challengers.110  This form of co-option can occur 
simultaneously with institutional co-option where dissenting voices are added to state 
decision-making processes. Specifically, this co-option occurs when the dissident is 
absorbed into the dominant belief system through the “decreased political content of 
his activity.”111
Institutional Co-option  
 While similar to ideological co-option in some aspects, it is markedly 
distinct; ideological co-option would mean that those who are dominated are deluded 
or ‘tricked’ into accepting the ideology of those with power while psychological co-
option involves certain compromises on the part of the ruling class such that those 
who are co-opted willingly reduce their dissenting activities such that their views 
converge.  
 Institutional co-option is more straightforward; it involves the ruling party or 
the state incorporating groups or individuals into formal decision-making processes. 
As discussed in the earlier section, the PAP has employed this strategy on more than 
one occasion. This mode of co-option serves to legitimize the state and give it more 
credibility in the decisions that are eventually taken.  
 Saward is critical of the above-mentioned typology. Firstly, he argues that 
authors, especially those that are Marxist-inclined, almost exclusively portray co-
option as a negative and unconstructive process. Saward finds a pessimistic view of 
co-option to be problematic since there might be cases where co-option actually 
brings about mutual benefits; for the state, the co-opted and the society as a whole.112
                                                          
110 Saward, Co-optive Politics, 16. 
 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid., 29. 
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Secondly, he argues that these authors like Gramsci and Michels tend to make a priori 
claims about co-optation and whether they are in fact strategies or outcomes. While 
Saward does not dismiss the existence of institutional and psychological forms of co-
option, he argues that the authors who use them often mistakenly judge them on the 
basis of outcomes instead of strategies. For example, to ascertain whether there exists 
ideological co-optation, authors will look at whether there is subordination of the 
masses and then formulate the argument that this domination is due to the existence of 
hegemony or ideological co-optation, instead of starting with conscious decisions on 
the part of the state to ideologically co-opt the masses and then trace out the process. 
Hence, co-option is often proven through outcomes instead of strategies. Saward 
contends that this is a major deficiency in most works on psychological and 
ideological co-option. His third major criticism of this model is that it excludes the 
interests and motivations of the co-opted.  
 However, despite acknowledging that the ideological and psychological 
strands of co-optation are not invalid, he focuses only on the institutional type. In 
addition, he suggests that co-option should only be understood as a strategy and not as 
an outcome. This is where I depart from him as I believe that both institutional 
(formal) and non-institutional (informal) forms of co-option are crucial to 
understanding the concept and why non-state actors are often in cooperation with the 
state. Furthermore, in some cases (especially in the cases of informal co-optation), it 
would be instructive to study both strategies and outcomes to verify the existence of 






My model of co-option 
 Drawing upon the above literature, I formulate my own version of the 
competing styles of co-optation. I classify them into two major categories, formal and 
informal. 
Table 2.2.3 
     Types of Co-optation 










Co-option is a strategy and/or 
outcome 
Who is Co-opted 
 
Groups (large and small), 
Individuals 
Groups large and small 
Examples from 
Singapore 





Source: My own formulation 
 I have simplified the model to the two basic forms of co-option. Formal co-
option is equivalent to Saward’s idea of institutional co-option. Co-option is a 
conscious strategy by the state. This strategy could manifest itself in two ways; one, 
the state brings a group/individual under its direct charge/purview/jurisdiction or two, 
the state sends one of its trusted members to be in charge of the organization. For 
informal co-option, it could include either the ideological or psychological type and 
co-option can be either a strategy or a consequence, or both. The state adopts co-
option in a more polished manner, either through giving certain concessions to the 
organization, engaging with them more outside of the formal deliberative networks 
and getting them to adopt certain ideas and philosophies of the state (and/or abandon 
existing ideas or methods that are not conducive to the state). Since we cannot always 
conclusively prove that informal co-optation is present purely by looking at existing 
                                                          
113 As mentioned earlier, this is hinted by Rahim. I am agnostic about this as further research is 
needed establish this.  
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structures due to the possibility of the covert nature of the relationship between the 
state and the organizations, perceptions of the members of the organization and the 
Muslim community towards them will be utilized to make a case for its existence.  
In both types of co-option, there is consent (though to differing extents) on the 
part of these organizations, that is, they allow themselves to be co-opted to some 
degree. The consequences of this are not always negative, though they could be in 
some cases. 
 I argue that for MUIS, there exist both formal and informal co-optation while 
for Pergas, only the latter is present. I further argue that both MUIS and Pergas are 
acutely aware of their actions. The evidence for these and the consequences will be 
discussed in the coming chapters on the two organizations.  
Reasons for co-optation 
The state 
 Firstly, the state co-opts various groups and individuals in order to enhance its 
legitimacy. As argued by most authors, the most crucial purpose of co-option for the 
state is to legitimize its own authority.114 The state can be strengthened by the co-
option of religious figures. States have always sought to get the religious figures on 
their side, being fully aware of the mobilization potential of these people. Muslim 
states have not been any different, Saeed suggests, and have implemented various 
means to institutionalize religion and bureaucratize faith; and one of these means 
include the co-option of religious scholars.115
                                                          
114 Saward, Co-optive Politics, 33. 
 Saeed contends that the ultimate 
purpose of co-option is to legitimize the authority of the rulers who otherwise would 
be seen as secular or non-religious. By having the ulama in their midst, the masses 
115 Abdullah Saeed, “The Official Ulema and Religious Legitimacy of the Modern Nation State,” in 
Islam and Political Legitimacy, eds. Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 14-21. 
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would be convinced that the rulers are on the ‘right’ religious path since men of great 
religious standing support their rule. Such a strategy bears even more significance in 
societies where religion plays an immense role in the daily lives of the citizens. 
Interestingly, Saeed believes that while states have wanted that to happen, the 
strategy, in many cases, does not bear the desired outcomes. States do not increase 
their legitimacy through the co-optation of religious scholars, rather the converse 
happens: the credibility of the scholars diminishes due to their involvement with the 
secular state.116
 Perhaps the most spectacular example of such a policy would be the decision 
of United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the major component party of 
Malaysia’s ruling National Front, to co-opt the highly popular Anwar Ibrahim in 
1982.
 This is relevant for our discussion and will be developed further later.  
117 Anwar who had made his name as the leader of the vastly influential youth 
organization, Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), was brought into the UMNO 
fold. ABIM was at the forefront of the Islamic revivalist movement in Malaysia and 
Anwar had developed a reputation for being an ‘Islamic’ figure. Hence, in one fell 
swoop, UMNO managed to legitimize its authority by the induction of Anwar into its 
midst and at the same time, out-Islamize their most significant political rival, PAS 
(the Islamic Party of Malaysia).118
 The implications of this line of thinking are manifest: if the state deems a 
particular person or entity to be worthy of co-optation, it must mean that that person 




                                                          
116 Ibid., 27. 
 The ‘power’ mentioned here can refer to a variety of things, chief of which is 
the power to legitimize or mobilize. In the case of Anwar, UMNO under the 
117 Pushpa Tambipillai, “Malaysia: Twenty-Five and Pragmatic,” Southeast Asian Affairs (1983): 210. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Saward, Co-optive Politics, 29. 
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leadership of Dr Mahathir Mohamad realized that Anwar had the power to mobilize 
the masses in support of or against UMNO, and thus decided to co-opt him. It must 
also be stressed that in actuality, it is not the ‘power’ that the individual/group has that 
matters, but it is the perceived power that is pertinent. That is, the perception of the 
state towards the level of power these people/organizations possess or have the 
potential to possess is what matters. Therefore, while a small religious organization 
may or may not have the power to oppose or cause disturbances to the state’s rule, the 
fear of religion itself and its mobilization potential might cause states to be 
additionally wary of any religious organization and measures might be taken to 
counter its influence. Co-optation is one such measure. 
 Secondly, the co-opted person or group might have some skills or resources 
that the state needs and would like to utilize.120
The Co-Opted 
 This is a more neutral and value-free 
reason that is often overlooked. It could be that the state is genuinely concerned about 
the affairs of its citizens in certain areas, and thus enlists the help of people with the 
necessary skills-sets to assist in its governance. For example, the state in Singapore 
could be argued to be concerned with the religion of the Malays, the constitutionally-
recognized indigenous people, and hence employs religious scholars to assist in 
managing the community’s affairs. This would then be a plausible explanation for the 
co-optation of MUIS.  
 According to Saward, for the potentially co-opted entity, there are a myriad of 
reasons for them to enter into such an arrangement with the state. Firstly, it could be 
that the state and the organization has the same end goal, hence mutual collaboration 




would enable them to reach the goal much quicker.121
 Secondly, the co-opted entity will presumably get to influence the decisions of 
the state, with regards to the issues that it stands for. While the outcome of the final 
decision might not be the one that the co-opted entity had wished for, due to the 
lopsided power distribution vis-a-vis the state, the decision would be nearer to their 
position since the state would be more willing to compromise with an entity that is 
within rather than from outside.
 This is where the state can tap 
upon the organization’s expertise, while at the same time the organization can use the 
state’s ample resources to pursue its goals, which is invariably tied to or similar with 
the state’s. 
122
 In addition, the co-opted body might gain additional cachet due to the 
influence it has since it is state-endorsed, and so it might “gain recognition as the most 
significant, if not the only serious, voice of the interest(s) they claim to represent, and 
in some cases a representational monopoly can be the result.”
 Whether this is true has to be proven, but the fact 
remains that organizations do use such justifications for their co-option. 
123
 Here the writing of Scott will be introduced. In his Weapons of the Weak: 
Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, he discussed the subtleties of resistance and 
 Especially in the 
realm of religion, even more so for Islam where there are so many competing versions 
of those who claim to have access to the “truth”, an organization could see this as a 
massive motivation to get more influence so that they could counter what they 
perceive to be ‘deviant’ teachings. In other words, the organization wants to out-do 
other similar entities in order to reach its audience better. Hence co-optation could be 
a viable strategy for the co-opted. 
                                                          
121 Ibid., 29. 




how the ‘weak’ respond to conditions around them in order to resist the dominant 
order. While Scott was focussing specifically on peasants in Malaysia, I argue that his 
observations are relevant in explaining why organizations, which are generally much 
weaker than the state, agree to be co-opted.  
 The basic premise of Scott’s work is that subordinate classes often have not 
engaged in open defiance or organized political activity because they cannot afford to, 
and that subordinate classes have rarely wanted to entirely revamp the system of the 
society in which they operate, rather, they want to “work the system to their minimum 
disadvantage.”124
 Scott narrates the example of Razak, a poor peasant from the village, who 
becomes a member of the local ruling party that dominates politics to the extent that 
its influence filters down to everyday occurrences of the villagers.
 This is crucial to understanding the different types of responses 
organizations display with regards to the state; these organizations will devise a 
response after making calculations as to which strategy will minimize their 
disadvantage. Scott highlights the peasants’ insignificant status, yet he does not 
discount their role and agency in shaping the structures around them, regardless of 
how small this role is. An array of strategies and responses to these strategies was also 
highlighted by Scott, and it will be helpful to discuss a few here. 
125 Razak realizes 
that by becoming affiliated with the people in power, he stood to gain more than if he 
was not associated with them. As he declared, “If you go with the crowd, there’s a lot 
to be had. With the minority, it would be difficult. I used my head. I want to be on the 
side of the majority.”126
                                                          
124 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985), xv. 
 This is despite him realizing that through such an association, 
he will be more loathed by his fellow villagers. Joining the party did not mean he felt 




indebted towards the ruling elites or the people who helped alleviate his position; he 
still felt that those people were just using people like him to their advantage.127
 Herein lies the most basic prototype of a reason for why the co-opted entity 
allows itself to be co-opted; it realizes that by doing so, whether or not it believes in 
the cause of the state, it will be beneficial to its survival. While this may seem 
obvious, the point that needs to be stressed upon here is that the person/organization 
has a choice as to whether he/it wants to be co-opted, and it is not entirely up to the 
state, no matter how far-reaching the arm of the state is. If the organization decides to 
be co-opted, it will reap advantages that others would not gain but not without 
consequences of its own and if it does not, it will have to survive on its own, which 
may prove problematic in societies where the state has tremendous penetration. As in 
the case of Razak, the perceptions of his community worsened as a result of his choice 
to get involved with the ruling elite. This is a potential danger for any co-opted entity. 
 In 
spite of knowing this, he continued to be part of the party. It was abundantly clear that 
his affiliation with the ruling party was a marriage of convenience, not one based on 
his belief in the values upheld by the party. 
 However, the reaction towards being dominated is typically more concealed 
and informal. Since open insubordination was never an option, most of the peasants, 
much like the Black slaves in America in the past, engaged in “foot dragging, false 
compliance, flight, feigned ignorance, sabotage, theft and cultural resistance.”128
                                                          
127 Ibid., 12. 
 Scott 
argues that while these tactics did not call into question the oppressive nature of the 
systems the peasants were entrapped in, they had far more pronounced effects in 
changing state policy than open defiance. He tries to prove the existence of these 
128 Ibid., 34. 
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modes of resistance in the village by studying their words and everyday language, 
which he believes articulates their intentions and ideas.129
 What we have here are three options against domination; formal co-option, 
open defiance and passive resistance. Scott suggests that most peasants (and 
dominated classes) will use the third option.  
 
 I argue that for the Singapore context, open defiance is not a suitable approach 
for religious organizations in dealing with the state.130
 Informal co-option is a viable choice for the organizations for a couple of 
reasons. Firstly, formal co-option might hurt its reputation amongst the masses (as in 
Razak’s case) so informal co-option will give them the benefits of formal co-option 
without many of its detrimental effects. Secondly, the organization still retains its 
independence and is not bounded by any formal arrangement; hence it could ‘leave’ 
the arrangement whenever it feels that the costs of association outweigh the benefits. 
Both reasons, I argue, apply in Pergas’ case. 
 Considering the way the state 
views religion, the state will attempt to oversee, legislate and control religious 
organizations as best as it can. Therefore religious organizations are left with the 
following choices: formal co-option, informal co-option or full independence from the 
government (but even then, it will be subject to the tough laws that govern religion). 
Informal co-optation can be viewed as a form of passive resistance, though of a 
different kind to Scott’s description. 
 Undeniably, Scott was referring to peasants and his was a case of class 
resistance, to examine how the subordinated (lower classes) respond to domination. I 
am extrapolating some of his ideas to state-religious organizations relations, since 
there is an element of mismatch of power (the ‘dominant’ being the state, while the 
                                                          




‘weak’ being the religious organizations). Under such a framework, it is not a 
criticism of Scott of any form that his analysis does not fully apply. Nevertheless, his 
work has been introduced to show that the ‘weak’ or the politically insignificant 
actors have their own methods to ‘force the hand’ of the state, and to affect changes in 
policy. Scott’s main relevance to this paper is that he proved that even the most 
dominated of classes, the peasants, have a say in how their fates are shaped, and thus 
showing that there is agency in any analysis between entities holding vastly differing 
power positions.  
The Model 
 Having discussed the various types of co-optation and the motivations behind 
them, I return to the crux of my paper, the nature of secularism employed by the state. 
While agreeing with the two types of secularism introduced by Ramakrishna, in light 
of the discussion on co-optation, I introduce a third type: calibrated secularism. 
Calibrated Secularism refers to a subtle approach by the state, whereby it 
relies on informal co-optation to manage the religious organization. As discussed 
extensively above, both the informally co-opted organization and the state stand to 
gain from such an arrangement, though there are risks involved. I have also added 
formal co-optation as a plausible characteristic of muscular secularism since it is a 
form of direct intervention. 
It must be emphasised that the strategies of muscular secularism and calibrated 
secularism are not necessarily mutually exclusive and can exist simultaneously. 
Calibrated secularism could be used in addition to muscular secularism, and I argue 






  A Three-part Typology of State Secularist Strategies 
Strategy Employed Features Organization(s) Involved 
Muscular Secularism • Direct, Interventionist 
approach 
• Tough legislation 
• Constant interference in 
the realm of religious 
affairs 
• Formal Co-option 
All religious organizations 
in Singapore, including 
MUIS and Pergas 
 
Calibrated Secularism • Indirect, subtle approach 
• Informal co-optation – 
Co-optation is an 
outcome and/or strategy 
• Symbiotic relationship 
between government and 
organization 
Pergas 
Liberal Secularism • Minimal/no interference 
from state  
• Allows for open 
discussion (and hence 
criticisms) of religious 
ideas 
• Protects individual 
liberties; right to 
practice/spread religion 
is always respected 
None 
Source: My own formulation, drawing upon Ramakrisha (2010) and Saward (1992). 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 Undeniably, the Singapore government, just like any other state, has adopted 
strategies – and will continue doing so – to maintain its electoral dominance. While 
employing the ‘knuckleduster’ approach has been a pronounced feature of the PAP’s 
approach, it would be a mistake to ignore the more nuanced and nimble strategies of 
theirs. Co-optation, as in the cases of the media, grassroots organizations, trade unions 
and Majlis Pusat, is the main characteristic of this subtlety.  
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 The co-optation policy is extended to the realm of religion, whereby not only 
harsh laws governing faiths are in place, but religious organizations are co-opted, both 
formally and informally, into the state mechanism. Religious organizations, mindful 
of the consequences of not pandering to the state and of the advantages of 
cooperation, choose to embark on the process of co-option. What we have then is a 
more comprehensive framework, building upon Ramakrishna’s work, of secularism in 
Singapore. Three types of secularism are posited, namely muscular, liberal and 
calibrated secularism. Only muscular and calibrated secularism are even considered 
by the state that is so wary of religion. While this study focuses on the management of 
Islam in Singapore, I believe that it can be applied to the state’s management of other 
religions in Singapore and also, elsewhere in the world.  
 However, these policies are not without consequences for both the state and 
these organizations, whether positive or otherwise. In the following chapters, I shall 
discuss MUIS and Pergas in detail; the backgrounds of these organizations, evidence 





Chapter 3: Religious Representation in Secular Singapore - MUIS  
  As discussed earlier, there many justifications for both the state to co-opt an 
organization and for the organization to agree to such an arrangement. I will argue 
that MUIS is both formally (institutionally) and informally (ideologically) co-opted 
by the state. Furthermore, this is a conscious decision made by MUIS, fully aware of 
the costs and benefits of this pact. This decision was a calculated and rational one, a 
‘weapon of the weak’.131
 The process of the co-optation of MUIS is part of a larger approach towards 
religion and stability in Singapore. It represents the state’s distinct version of 
secularism. The strategies of muscular secularism (where there are strict laws 
governing what MUIS can or cannot do and it is formally co-opted) and calibrated 
secularism (where MUIS is ideologically co-opted) are simultaneously employed. 
This is not dissimilar to the experience of the Malaysian state, where it is often 
heralded as the example of “moderate” Islam and social stability.
  
132 According to 
Hamayotsu, Malaysia has managed to successfully bureaucratize and institutionalize 
religious organizations through various methods, chiefly co-optation, such that 
religious extremism has been curbed. She argues that the state’s motivation to co-opt 
religious organizations is fuelled by three main factors: firstly, to stifle religious 
extremism, secondly, to gain legitimacy amongst the Muslim-majority electorate133
                                                          
131 Scott, Weapons of the Weak.  
 
by out-Islamizing the opposition parties (especially Parti Islam Se-Malaysia) and 
finally, the desire by state actors to gain support within their own parties (as a person 
132 The US, amongst others, views Malaysia as such. See Jeffrey C. Kennedy, “Leadership in Malaysia: 
Traditional Values, International Outlook,” The Academy of Management Executive, 16 (2002): 15. 
133 This similar to Saeed’s argument. 
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who is perceived as pro-Islam might gain additional support even from within the 
party).134
 While the third reason might be irrelevant to the Singapore context, I concur 
with the first two factors, albeit to differing degrees. The entire approach towards 
religion of the Singapore government is undoubtedly based on preventing the 
breeding of religious extremism of any kind. In addition, co-opting religious scholars 
is hoped to give the state legitimacy amongst the Muslim masses.  
  
The religious organizations, in turn, realize the benefits of cooperating with 
the state in such a manner. However, by allowing themselves to be co-opted, their 
credibility is called into question at times by their own constituents, a trade-off that is 
made in their attempts to deal with an overbearing state. 
3.1 Historical Overview, Aims, Functions 
  The Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS) or Islamic Religious Council of 
Singapore has a special position in the country for numerous reasons. MUIS is 
acknowledged under the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA), which is 
enshrined in the country’s constitution. In the secular state of Singapore, the existence 
of AMLA is remarkable and seems contradictory with the secular declarations of the 
ruling elites, but is perfectly consistent with the model that I have developed. AMLA 
is “an act relating to Muslims and to make provision for regulating Muslim religious 
affairs and to constitute a council to advise on matters relating to the Muslim religion 
in Singapore and a Syariah Court.”135
                                                          
134 Kikue Hamayotsu, “Institutionalized Religion and the Politics of Co-optation in Malaysia,” (PhD 
diss., Australia National University, 2005), 4-5. 
 Under this act, which is an extension of the 






constitutional rights given to the Malays where they are acknowledged as the 
indigenous people of the land, and where it is incumbent upon the government of the 
day to protect their interests that include religious ones, Muslims are given certain 
privileges and exceptions to civil law in certain instances. These include the rights for 
to apply their own laws and customs with regards to marriage and divorce, and the 
right for Muslim men to practise polygamy, in accordance with Islamic law. The 
Syariah court is given legal authority to be the arbiter in the implementation of these 
laws. This is a concession given by the state that is unique to Islam. 
 Various factors have been argued to explain the existence of MUIS. It was 
established in 1968, amidst difficult socio-political conditions the state was facing in 
relation to its Malay/Muslim neighbours. Considering that the Malays were a special 
minority and had ties bounded by ethnicity to the Malaysians and Indonesians, the 
government saw it necessary to mollify the Malays. This is not only to ensure that the 
Malay citizens remained loyal to the state but also to not give Singapore’s larger and 
more powerful neighbours, who felt a sense of obligation to protect the Malays in the 
Chinese-dominated country, an excuse to meddle in Singapore’s domestic affairs.136 
The establishment of MUIS was part of these efforts to placate the state’s Malay 
neighbours.137
                                                                                                                                                                      
p%3Bletter%3DInterpretation%2520Act%3BorderBy%3DtitleDown%3BpNum%3D1%3Btype%3DactsAl
l
 As Chan aptly terms it, it was part of the “politics of survival” for the 
city-state. Others have cited reasons such as the aspiration of the state to curb Malay 
and Islamic extremism, and hence institutionalizing Islam via the creation of MUIS 
 (accessed 27 March, 2012). Syariah refers to Islamic jurisprudential rulings/laws. 
136 UMNO especially felt a sense of duty to “protect” the well-being of Singapore Malays. Refer to Carl 
A. Trocki, Singapore: Wealth, Power and the Culture of Control (London, New York: Routledge, 2006), 
11. 
137 Chan Heng Chee, Singapore: The Politics of Survival (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), 17.  
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was a way to achieve this. With the existence of MUIS, every religious activity had to 
be sanctioned by it and actions of defiant Muslims could be thwarted more easily.138
 Importantly for this paper, the position of MUIS is acknowledged, and its roles 
defined, under this act of the Singapore Constitution. MUIS has six main functions, 
namely: 
 
i) Advise the President of Singapore in matters relating to the Muslim 
religion in Singapore. 
ii) Administer matters relating to the Muslim religion and Muslims in 
Singapore including any matter relating to the Haj or halal139
iii) Administer all Muslim endowments and funds vested in it under any 
written law or trust. 
 certification. 
iv) Administer the collection of zakat and fitrah140
v) Administer all mosques and Muslim religious schools in Singapore. 
 and other charitable 
contributions for the support and promotion of the Muslim religion or for 
the benefit of Muslims. 
vi) Carry out functions that are conferred upon MUIS by or under any written 
law, including AMLA.141
                                                          
138 Husain Haikal and Atiku Garba Yahaya, “Muslim Organizations in Singapore: A Historical Overview,” 
Islamic Studies, 35 (1996): 442-443. 
 
139 Food that is deemed permissible to be consumed according to Islamic jurisprudence.  
140 Zakat and Fitrah are alms that need to be given by Muslims for certain groups such as the poor. 








Evidently, the duties of MUIS are almost all-encompassing with regards to the 
Muslim community’s affairs and it is safe to say that there is hardly any aspect of a 
Muslim’s life that is not penetrated or affected by the decisions or actions of MUIS.  
The President of MUIS, currently Alami Musa, is considered to be the most 
powerful office-holder in the organization. He is appointed by the President of 
Singapore and the latter has the authority to terminate the MUIS President’s 
appointment if he deems it to be in the “public interest” to do so.142
 Perhaps the most important role played by MUIS is the issuance of fatwa. A 
fatwa is non-binding religious edict issued by Muslim scholars that are meant to 
provide religious guidance and rulings. Though a fatwa is non-binding, it is of 
immense importance in any Muslim community, since Muslims look to the religious 
scholars to guide them in their religious affairs. The Mufti, the highest religious 
authority in any Muslim community, heads the MUIS fatwa committee and again, the 
Mufti is appointed by the President of Singapore.
 The Minister of 
Muslim Affairs, a cabinet position that is exclusive to Islam and not the other faiths in 
Singapore, has the power to appoint the Secretary of MUIS, who in the absence of a 
Vice-President (a Vice-President may be appointed by the President of Singapore if 
he so wishes) is the second-in-command. 
143 The committee is tasked with 
issuing edicts pertaining to religious issues, answering questions and clarifying 
confusions regarding matters of the faith. Currently, the Mufti of Singapore is Dr 
Fatris Bakaram, who from the beginning of 2011 succeeded Syaikh Isa Semait who 
had served as the Mufti for thirty-eight years prior to that.144
                                                          
142 Ibid. 
 There are four 
143 Ibid. 
144 “PM thanks retired Mufti for his ‘wisdom, judgment and leadership,’” The Straits Times, 22 
January, 2011.  
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permanent members on the current fatwa committee apart from the Mufti: Ustaz 
Hasbi Hassan, Ali Mohamed, Firdaus Yahya and Zulkifli Othman.145
 While MUIS is in charge of many matters of the Muslim community, it is no 
exaggeration to say that they are more likely to be judged for their actions in the 
issuance of fatwa than say, the matter of halal certification. This is because a fatwa is 
considered to be something sacred, as it is a religious ruling that is based upon the 
commandment of God, whereas other matters are administrative ones where mistakes 
are more likely to be tolerated. This is the view of most of the respondents surveyed 
and interviewed. 
 The presence of 
Ustaz Hasbi on the committee is particularly intriguing considering that he is the 
current President of Pergas; clearly there exists some sort of a symbiotic relationship 
between the two organizations. 
 MUIS is officially a statutory board under the purview of the Ministry of 
Culture, Community and Youth (MCCY). However, the Minister in-charge of Muslim 
Affairs is responsible for the organization; MUIS is directly under the jurisdiction of 
this Minister, currently Dr Yaacob Ibrahim,146 who may or may not concurrently hold 
the MCCY portfolio. The Minister in-charge of Muslim Affairs recommends 
members for the MUIS Council, the highest decision-making board in the 
organization in terms of administrative and strategic direction matters.147
 That MUIS is institutionally or formally co-opted is not a matter for debate; 
the organization itself is a statutory board under a government Ministry. MUIS reports 
directly to a government Minister (the Minister in-charge of Muslim Affairs). This 
 
                                                          
145 MUIS. Acessed 28 March 2012. http://www.muis.gov.sg/cms/oomweb/fatwa.aspx?id=14686  
146 Dr Yaacob has been holding the position since 2002. Refer to Singapore Cabinet. Accessed 20 May 
2012. http://www.cabinet.gov.sg/content/cabinet/appointments/dr_yaacob_ibrahim.html.  
147 MUIS. Accessed 28 March 2012. http://www.muis.gov.sg/cms/aboutus/default.aspx  
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Minister also has the power to choose members of the MUIS Board, and advises the 
President of Singapore on the appointments of the President of MUIS and Mufti. 
Therefore within the framework that I have discussed, MUIS is undoubtedly formally 
co-opted. 
What needs to be ascertained is whether this formal co-option has an effect on 
the way MUIS performs its functions, and whether there is ideological/psychological, 
or informal, co-option. This will be done by analysing MUIS’ actions, statements and 
the perceptions of the community.  
3.2 Evidences of Informal Co-option: Statements, Actions and Inactions 
 Here, I shall study four cases to deduce whether, and the extent to which, 
informal co-optation exists. These are: the ten desired values for the Singapore 
Muslim Identity (SMI) formulated by MUIS, the hijab issue, the madrasah and 
Compulsory Education (CE) saga in the early 2000s and the building of the 
casinos/Integrated Resorts in Singapore. The ten desired attributes reflect the 
organization’s worldview and their vision for the Muslim community, and hence is 
highly important towards understanding MUIS. The tudung and madrasah issues 
were undoubtedly the two most significant events in the Muslim community’s 
relations with the state in the past decade, and therefore they have been chosen. The 
reactions of MUIS at such critical junctures must be analyzed. The casino issue, 
though it did not generate as much media attention as the other two cases, is no less 
noteworthy as it indicates the amount of state interference in religious matters. Thus 




10 Desired Attributes of SMI 
The following are the ten attributes: 
1) Holds strongly to Islamic principles while adapting itself to changing context. 
2) Morally and spiritually strong to be on top of challenges of modern society. 
3) Progressive, practices Islam beyond form/rituals and rides the modernization 
wave. 
4) Appreciates Islamic civilization and history and have good understanding of 
contemporary issues. 
5) Appreciates other civilizations and is self-confident to interact with and learn 
from other communities. 
6) Believes that good Muslims are good citizens.  
7) Well-adjusted as a member of a multi-religious society and secular state. 
8) Be a blessing to all and promote universal principles and values. 
9) Inclusive and practices pluralism, without contradicting Islam. 
10)  Be a model and inspiration to all.148
The SMI is drafted by MUIS to serve as a guide for Muslims in the leading 
their lives in Singapore. Upon critical analysis, one could infer that that is not the only 
reason. I argue that a second reason for MUIS coming up with these attributes is to 
project itself in favourable terms vis-a-vis the state.  
 
Two of the ten principles discuss modernization and how Muslims must adapt 
to it. This is fundamentally in line with the state’s principle of urging its citizens to 
adjust to the ever-changing modern, global context and accept, not reject or even be 
                                                          





indifferent to, modernization and globalization.149 An even deeper analysis could 
insinuate that MUIS is actually adopting the idea advocated by the PAP government 
that the Malays/Muslims are not economically productive and have not responded 
favourably enough to modernization. PAP leaders from Dr Ahmad Mattar to Abdullah 
Tarmugi have espoused such views.150
It is clear that some of the values are unabashedly in line with the state’s; the 
belief that good Muslims are necessarily good citizens, adjusting well to the multi-
religious society and promoting universal values. These values, though seemingly 
formulated to please the state, are not necessarily contentious as most Muslims would 
agree that these are congruent with the teachings of Islam. Two other points though, 
are not as straightforward. 
 
First is the acknowledgement of the ‘secular’ state and the assertion that 
Muslims have to adjust to this. While this might seem a trivial point, as I had 
discussed in the introductory chapter, the term secular carries many negative 
connotations for Muslims. Pergas issued a statement declaring secularism in any 
shape or form to be against the spirit of Islam, illustrating this very well.151
Even more debatable is the ninth point, where Muslims are asked to practise 
‘pluralism’. While there are, undeniably, many understandings of religious pluralism, 
it is equally indisputable that one of the definitions of pluralism is the acceptance that 
all religions are equal and that there are many differing paths to the same God. This is 
 MUIS 
however, is more willing to embrace usage of this term. 
                                                          
149 Gillian Koh and Ooi Giok Ling, “Singapore: A Home, A Nation?” Southeast Asian Affairs (2002): 255-
256. 
150 “Mendaki plans on having ‘Smart’ parents,” The Straits Times, 2 March 1998.  
151 PERGAS, Moderation in Islam in the Context of the Muslim Community in Singapore, Working 




an understanding that is unacceptable to most, if not all Muslims, and while I am 
confident that is not the meaning intended by MUIS, the usage of the term is 
controversial. Authority figures as notable as the Malaysian Prime Minister, Najib 
Tun Razak, himself the leader of a multi-religious nation, has warned Muslims against 
pluralism stating that while Islam promotes diversity and tolerates other faiths, Islam 
does not accept that the other religions are equal.152 The fact that MUIS even uses 
terms such as ‘secular’ and ‘pluralism’ in spite of their litigious nature indicates its 
acceptance of state terminologies, if not ideologies.  Tan (2011) aptly describes the 
SMI as an enterprise by MUIS and the state to “craft a desired Islamic-Singaporean 
identity” that will not be affected by foreign ‘versions’ of Islam.153
The Tudung / Hijab Issue 
 
 In early 2002, the parents of four primary school girls sent their children to 
national schools donning the hijab.154 In the highly authoritarian state that is 
Singapore, such an open defiance of the state’s concept of secularism was an 
audacious move. This was swiftly met with criticisms from the ruling elites. The 
senior PAP members chided those involved, especially Zulfikar Shariff who was 
alleged to be the chief instigator, with labels of Muslim extremism and accused them 
of attempting to disrupt the social fabric of the country.155
 How MUIS, and in particular the Mufti (Shaykh Isa Semait) reacted was 
startling. The Mufti issued a fatwa stating that the “injunction to study and seek 
 
                                                          
152 Adil Zalkapli, “Najib warns Malaysians against Religious Pluralism,” The Malaysian Insider, 4 April 
2012. 
153 Eugene Tan, “Keeping Politics and Religion Separate in the Public Sphere,” 210. 
154 Chang Li Lin, “Singapore’s Troubled Relations with Malaysia: A Singapore Perspective,” Southeast 
Asian Affairs (2003): 267-268. 
155 Kenneth Paul Tan, “Crisis, Self-Reflection and Rebirth in Singapore’s National Cycle,” Southeast 
Asian Affairs (2003): 244. 
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knowledge in Islam is greater than that of to study.”156 He believed that since the girls 
had not yet reached the age of puberty, it was not compulsory for them to wear the 
hijab and that the parents were merely politicizing the issue by continuing to be 
defiant despite advice from MUIS.157
 This is a tremendously pertinent case. In the Shafii school of thought that the 
majority of the Muslim community in Singapore belongs to and that the fatwa 
committee tries to adhere to, wearing the hijab is compulsory for every Muslim 
female.
 
158 While technically what the Mufti said was correct, since seeking education 
is given a profound emphasis in Islamic jurisprudence, the point of contention for the 
Muslim community is why they are disallowed from seeking knowledge and wearing 
the hijab at the same time. This was something that the Mufti and MUIS did not 
address and it triggered a variety of responses, most notably from Pergas. Pergas 
stated that while it is true that a religious requirement can be relaxed when there is a 
hindrance or “darurat”, that is, under exigent circumstances, they found it imperative 
to “emphasize that this (exceptional) situation where one is forced or hindered, cannot 
be allowed to remain so indefinitely. No Muslim is allowed to remain complacent and 
feel satisfied with such hindrance towards fulfilling the religious obligation for the 
modest covering of aurat.159”160 They even went further by saying that the issue 
should not be closed “just because the Mufti had made a statement.”161
                                                          
156 “Keeping the faith, striking a balance,” The Straits Times, 21 January, 2011. 
 It has been 
157 Ibid. 
158 Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, a prominent scholar of Islam today, discussed this in his book The Lawful 
and Prohibited in Islam. Refer to http://irn.no/old/halal/lawfull.pdf. Accessed 21 May 2012. While 
there are some ulama who say that the donning the hijab is not obligatory, these are of the minority. 
MUIS’ fatwa council concurs with Qaradawi’s opinion as well.  
159 ‘Aurat’ refers to the parts of the body that must be covered according to Islamic jurisprudence.  
160 PERGAS, Moderation in Islam, 345.  
161 Ibid., 346. 
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said that this incident was a severe test of MUIS’ credibility as the leading Islamic 
organization in Singapore.162
 It must be emphasised that Maidin Packer, then Senior Parliamentary 
Secretary for Home Affairs, advised the Muslim community to heed the Mufti’s 
advice and not to pursue the matter anymore.
  
163 This is indicative of the symbiotic 
relationship between the state and MUIS. It also displays the usage of religious 
institutions by the state in order to affirm or legitimize their policies. This statement 
by Packer is in full accordance with Saeed’s assertion that states co-opt ulama to 
justify and lend credibility to their own policies.164
The Madrasah and CE saga 
 After the Mufti issued an edict that 
coincided with state policy, a Muslim official of the state quickly used the fatwa to 
calm the disquiet within the community and persuaded Muslims to accept the closure 
of the matter.   
 In 1999, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong caused an uproar amongst the 
Muslims through his critique of the madrasahs in Singapore. He suggested that the 
Compulsory Education (CE) scheme be implemented.165
                                                          
162 Ng Tze Lin, Tania, “The Role of Law in Managing God; Multi-Religiosity in Singapore,” Asian Journal 
of Public Affairs (2010): 11. 
 The scheme requires all 
students to go through six years of education (from primary one to six) in national 
schools. Predictably, such a proposal was met with strong criticisms and, for the most 
part, rejection by the Muslim community. Many quarters felt the CE would effectively 
put an end to the relevance of the madrasahs in Singapore, and this sentiment was 
163 Channel News Asia, 6 February 2002. 
164 Saeed, “The Official Ulema,” 14-21. 
165 Mukhlis Abu Bakar, “Between State Interests and Citizen Rights,” in Secularism and Spirituality: 
Seeking Integrated Knowledge and Success in Madrasah Education in Singapore, eds. Noor Aisha 
Abdul Rahman and Lai Ah Eng (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2006), 38.  
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most ardently conveyed by Pergas.166
 MUIS was non-committal, as it neither gave outright support to, nor did it 
oppose the proposal. The six madrasahs were understandably upset at MUIS for 
being unable to effectively champion their cause to the state,
  The conclusion to this episode will be 
explicated in the next chapter. 
167 and subsequently 
turned to Pergas for assistance.168 The relationship between the madrasahs and MUIS 
had always been one of an ambivalent nature, and this episode did not allay fears of 
the Muslim community that MUIS did not, or rather could not, represent the 
community’s interests when it mattered most. The madrasah is an extremely 
important institution in the community, both symbolically and functionally,169
The Casino/ Integrated Resorts Issue  
 and the 
fact that MUIS was perceived to have not acted in favour of preserving the madrasahs 
is of considerable significance: here again it could be construed as informal co-
optation as MUIS’ actions reinforced the perception that it had given precedence to 
the state’s interests over the community’s.    
 While the tudung and madrasah issues garnered extensive attention from the 
mainstream media and the Muslim community, there was another occurrence that was 
not as prominent, though no less significant. In 2009, Minister of Muslim Affairs 
Yaacob Ibrahim, in response to a question posed at a grassroots event, said that 
Muslims are allowed to work in the Integrated Resorts, as long as they are not directly 
                                                          
166 An elaboration of Pergas’ role/reaction in/to this episode will be given in the next chapter. 
167 Tan Tay Keong, “Social Capital and State-Civil Society Relations in Singapore,” (IPS Working Paper, 
2001), 22-23. 
168 Abu Bakar, “Between State Interests and Citizen Rights,” 39. 
169 Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman, “The Aims of Madrasah Education in Singapore: Problems and 
Perceptions,” in Secularism and Spirituality: Seeking Integrated Knowledge and Success in Madrasah 
Education in Singapore, eds. Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman and Lai Ah Eng (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish 
Academic, 2006), 58-60. 
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involved in the gaming sector.170 This statement had, arguably, profound 
implications: while the substance of the statement is not the issue in dispute here 
(though it could be), the fact that the Minister, and not the Mufti, issued such a 
statement is remarkable. Some even argue that the Mufti was undermined in this 
instance, as being the highest Islamic religious authority in the country he should have 
been the one issuing the edict, not the Minister.171
 Unsurprisingly, there was silent disgruntlement amongst the asatizah (Islamic 
Religious teachers) community, which will be illustrated later.  
 In what was an even more 
noteworthy development, MUIS and the Mufti did not issue any statement to affirm or 
deny what the Minister said. 
 The (non-) reactions of the Mufti and MUIS in these three cases (hijab, CE 
and IR) show their exact position within this secular state. While undoubtedly 
influential in religious issues that are non-controversial, they lack the power and 
ability to take the state head-on and in fact, to even disagree with the ruling elites. 
That they are informally co-opted, in my estimation, is evident from these instances.  
3.3 Evidence of Informal Co-option: Interviews and Public Perceptions 
 From the interviews and surveys conducted, it is apparent that the Muslim 
community in Singapore values and appreciates the various types of work done by 
MUIS, especially with respect to halal certification and the management of the Hajj 
affairs, which are two fundamental aspects of the Islamic faith. While problems do 
appear every now and then concerning these issues, generally members of the 
community do feel that MUIS is doing well in this regard. There are some misgivings 
                                                          
170 “Muslims can work in IRs, says Yaacob,” The Straits Times, 12 January 2009. 
171 A number of the asatizah (religious teachers) interviewed by me expressed this view.  
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about MUIS’ closeness to the state, however, especially when the relationship is 
perceived to be the reason behind MUIS’ actions (or inactions). 
 Ustaz Hasbi articulated that “MUIS could not do it (serve as the ‘conscience’ 
of the community). MUIS is a statutory board, they must serve the interests of the 
state. It is our (Pergas) responsibility to serve the interests of the Muslim 
community.”172
 A Muslim professional expressed his discontentment at MUIS’ constant need 
to pander to the state. He states: 
 Such a forthcoming assessment from the President of the most 
influential Muslim religious teachers’ organization is no doubt a reflection of the 
perceptions of at least some members of the community towards MUIS.  
“It is amazing how far MUIS goes to cater to the state. During the ‘tudung’ issue, the 
Mufti’s fatwa did not at all address the important question, that is, the right of Muslim 
women to exercise their religious rights in the country. For the casino issue, it was 
worse: MUIS did not even address the statement made by Yaacob (Minister of 
Muslim Affairs). These are just two examples. You can see many other similar 
stances adopted by MUIS, for example in 2003 when Singapore supported the illegal 
invasion of Iraq, MUIS did not say anything.. How do they expect Muslims to trust 
them?”173
 Apart from localised grievances, Muslims feel aggrieved at the perceived 
injustices of their co-religionists, in Palestine especially, and Singapore’s friendship 
with the state of Israel does not sit well with the majority of Muslims. This tension 
and unhappiness has been acknowledged by a few commentators.
  
174
 According to a former member of Pergas, MUIS is not executing its function 
well as its main duty is to “advise the government on affairs of the Muslim 
  
                                                          
172 Suzaina Kadir, “Muslim Politics, The State and Society,” in Renaissance Singapore?: Economy, 
Culture and Politics, ed. Kenneth Paul Tan (Singapore: NUS Press, 2007), 150.  
173 Interview with a Muslim civil servant, male, 27,  4 April 2012. Many other interviewees expressed 
similar views but the write has chosen this one in particular because he addresses many of the gripes 
that others uttered. 
174 There have been letters to and columns in BH that discuss this issue and reflect the communtiy’s 
sentiments. Refer to Hussin Mutalib, “Kesan hasrat Palestin disekat di PBB (Effects of the curtailment 
of Palestinian aspirations at the UN),” Berita Harian, 26 September 2011.  
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community, however, it seems like the government is the one that tells them what 
they can or cannot say.”175 The ex-Mufti has on several occasions reiterated that he 
has never been explicitly told by the government to make pronouncements in the 
latter’s favour, 176 though at the same time, he acknowledges that Muslims do not 
think that is true.177 However, this does not mean that MUIS bases its actions without 
considering state reactions. For example during the hijab issue, while undeniably 
there is no evidence of the Minister asking the Mufti to issue the edict that he 
eventually did, the possibility of the Mufti factoring the potential reactions of the state 
leaders into his decision-making cannot be discounted. Here the concept of power 
needs to be examined further. While it is not the intention of this paper to delve into 
this concept deeply, it must be understood that power should not be viewed solely 
through the decisions that are made; rather power can be represented through the 
erecting of barriers to the decision-making procedures, influencing values and 
practices of the decision-makers or the community and many more.178
The Mufti ultimately, is appointed by the state and the Muslim community 
knows this. This in itself already undermines the Mufti’s credibility, in the eyes of 
some. A Muslim academic interviewed went one step further in saying that Pergas 
should issue fatwa as well because presently, fatwa only emanate from one source, a 
 This paper 
argues that Lukes’ conception of latent power is patently relevant in MUIS’ decision-
making procedures and the decisions that follow themselves.   
                                                          
175 Interview with Pergas member, 15 March 2012. 
176 In an interview with Ustaz Hafiz Rafie, ex-Pergas Executive Committee and Associate Fatwa Council 
member, on 1 February 2012, he states that in his two years on the fatwa council, there has not been 
any interference from the state whatsoever. 
177 Kamaludeen Mohamed Nasir and Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied, Muslims as Minorities: History 
and Social Realities of Muslims in Singapore (Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2009), 
85. 
178 For a more detailed discussion on this, refer to Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
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“government source,” and that should not be the case.179 The fact that the President of 
Pergas, asatizah and members of the Muslim community share the sentiment that 
MUIS “serves the interests of the state” and cannot be wholly relied upon to be the 
“moral anchor”180
Eventually, the actions, statements and inactions of MUIS result in the 
formation of negative perceptions on the part of the Muslim community towards their 
co-operation with the state. Informal co-option can be partially deduced from actions 
and outcomes, and the perceptions of the community towards MUIS strengthen the 
claim that MUIS is informally co-opted. 
 of the community needs is exceptionally telling.  
3.4 Reasons for Co-option 
The State 
As explained, there are two main reasons why the state would co-opt MUIS. 
Firstly, by bureaucratizing Islam and having the power to appoint the highest religious 
authority in the nation, the government wishes to legitimize its own authority. While 
Saeed is discussing Muslims statesmen who wish to legitimize their rule, his 
argument still applies.181
                                                          
179 Interview with Muslim Academic, 15 March 2012. 
 Since some of the political decisions of the secular ruling 
elite venture into the religious realm, in those instances, it helps to have the religious 
elites endorsing their opinions. An illustration would be the Human Organ Transplant 
Act (HOTA): while Muslims were initially sceptical of the government’s push for 
Muslims to be included in the HOTA that “allows for the kidneys, heart, liver and 
corneas to be removed in the event of death from any cause for the purpose of 
180 Kadir, “Islam, State and Society in Singapore”: 364 
181 Saeed, “The Official Ulema,” 14-21. 
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transplantation,”182 MUIS’ fatwa alleviated some of these uncertainties.183
Secondly, the state recognizes that religious scholars have something that they 
could utilize, that is religious knowledge and authority. These scholars’ expertise is 
required by the state in order to facilitate the affairs of the Muslim community, 
whether in terms of halal food provision, hajj and mosque management, and other 
matters, that MUIS manages to execute so well. As argued by Saward, the state will 
have an incentive to co-opt a particular entity if it wishes to make use of the resources 
that the latter possess.
  The 
motivations and explanations for allowing this act were discussed in detail via the 
Friday sermon during the period that the issue was at the forefront. 
184
In the decision-making matrix of the state, it has to consider the implications 
of not co-opting religious organizations such as MUIS. The Malaysian experience has 
shown that the exclusion or non-co-optation of religious authorities could posit a 
disparaging effect, that is, “persistent radical religious mobilization in the society.”
 I do not intend to argue that the state desires to facilitate the 
affairs of the Muslim community through these various provisions out of pure 
altruism and their unwavering respect for the rights of the Malays as provided for by 
the Constitution; rather, the state does so for strategic reasons (not that there is 
anything wrong with this). Curbing Islamic extremism and pacifying its 
Malay/Muslim neighbours figure highly in this strategic assessment and the provision 
of such services, enabled through the co-option of MUIS, contributes towards 
achieving those goals.   
185
                                                          
182 Ministry of Health, 
 
http://www.moh.gov.sg/content/moh_web/home/legislation/legislation_and_guidelines/human_org
an_transplantact.html (accessed 18 April, 2012).  
183 MUIS, http://www.muis.gov.sg/cms/oomweb/fatwa.aspx?id=14698 (accessed 18 April, 2012).  
184 Saward, Co-optive Politics, 29. 
185 Hamayotsu, “Institutionalized Religion and the Politics of Co-optation in Malaysia,”, 8. 
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The desire to avoid this type of mobilization is instrumental to the state’s assessment 
to co-opt MUIS. In fact, as stated earlier, it was a key reason in the establishment of 
MUIS in the first place. Co-opting MUIS ideologically was the next logical step 
towards ensuring this. Incidentally, Pergas displayed the ability to mobilize the 
Muslim community in its ‘stand-off’ with the state during the hijab and madrasah 
issues, and this perhaps expedited the state’s decision to work towards co-opting 
Pergas as well.  
MUIS 
 The power asymmetry between MUIS and the state, while an obvious 
observation, must be emphasised. It is from the recognition of this power asymmetry 
that the nature of the relationship is formed, and the dynamics determined. It is also 
from this power differential that Scott’s work becomes relevant. As MUIS does not 
have the option of open insubordination in this authoritarian state, they are left with 
either co-option (formal and/or informal) or passive resistance.186
 Firstly, by being co-opted, it is beneficial and perhaps even integral to MUIS’ 
existence. I believe that MUIS realizes that it benefits greatly from its current 
arrangement with the state, as being a statutory board it has much more privileges and 
advantages compared to a private organization. While undoubtedly, there are certain 
instances where their ‘hands are tied’ and they might be perceived as giving in to the 
state excessively, overall, they believe that their closeness with the government gives 
  As demonstrated 
above, MUIS has not engaged in any form of outright resistance, rather they have 
openly embraced state ideologies and terminologies, supported state policy when they 
had to (HOTA) and remained silent when necessary (casino issue).  
                                                          
186 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 58. 
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them far greater benefits than costs.187 The primary advantage is that MUIS is not in 
any danger whatsoever of fading due to a lack of funds, unlike other organizations.188 
Considering that the Malay-Muslim community is for the most part not economically 
well-to-do, as long as MUIS’ financial security is assured, its existence would be as 
well. Being a statutory board guarantees this. The financial situation is not only due to 
the government’s provision of funds for MUIS, but also legislation that abets them. 
For example, a Parliamentary Bill was passed in 2008 to revise the Mosque Building 
and Mendaki Fund (MBMF), where Singaporean Muslims donate a higher amount 
through their Central Provident Funds (CPF), and MUIS will collect part of this 
contribution (Mendaki, another Malay-Muslim organization, will collect the rest). 
MUIS uses these contributions for the building and renovation of mosques.189 The 
fact that MUIS is able to amass funds through legislation for the building and 
maintenance of mosques is solely because of its position as a statutory board, or a co-
opted entity. In addition, while it has to compromise in some areas, MUIS gets to 
advise the state in others, and hence, will be able to influence some decisions of the 
state. This is visible in the areas of Muslim marriages, for example, where the state 
seeks MUIS’ advice in its dealings with the Muslim community in this aspect.190 
Saward’s prediction of the co-opted entity being able to negotiate a decision that is 
closer to its position then becomes relevant here.191
 Secondly, the relationship is also one borne out of necessity. If the Muslim 
community does not have any linkages with the state, there might develop mistrust 
 
                                                          
187 Interview with MUIS personnel, 20 March 2012. 
188 Such as Pergas, which relies on its own investments and donations from the Muslim community for 
its sustenance.  
189MUIS., 
http://www.muis.gov.sg/cms/uploadedFiles/MuisGovSG/MBF/AMLA%20MBMF%20BILL%20ASCENT
%20Gazette%202009.pdf (accessed 24 April, 2012). 
190 Interview with MUIS Personnel, 20 March 2012. 
191 Saward, Co-Optive Politics, 30. 
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and a sense of separateness.  MUIS acts as the representative of the community vis-à-
vis the state. This is aptly stated by a staff of MUIS, “The Muslim community needs 
to realize our position within the country. If MUIS does not have any links with the 
government, they might not have trust towards us. MUIS acts as the intermediary 
between the government and the Muslims, and it is a two-way process.  If everyone is 
antagonistic towards the government, they will not like the community very much. In 
the end, the Muslim community loses out.”192 This incisive assessment has to be 
weighed upon the larger political context: considering the mistrust that the PAP has 
towards Islam and Muslims in general,193
 Additionally, MUIS stand to be recognized as the “true voice of the interest(s) 
they represent.”
 it is perhaps necessary for MUIS to mitigate 
this situation, and allowing itself to be co-opted (formally and informally) is their way 
of doing this.  
194
Thus, in spite of understanding that by being co-opted the relationship will 
limit their actions in certain aspects, they allow themselves to be co-opted to “work 
the system to their minimum disadvantage.” 
 As such, it has the authority to spread the version of Islam it 
considers as true, the Ahlussunnah-wal-Jama’ah or Sunni version, through its 
penetrative powers. Hence, it can better manage or prevent the appeal of forms of 
Islam that the Sunnis regard as ‘deviant’.  
195
 
 Such a reaction to an overpowering 
state is consistent with the model developed in Chapter 2. 
                                                          
192 Interview with MUIS personnel, 23 March 2012. 
193 This is due to geopolitical conditions and the senior PAP leader’s worldviews. Refer to the 
evidences given in the first chapter.  
194 Saward, Co-optive Politics, 121. 
195 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, xv. 
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3.5 Analysis and Conclusion 
 There is almost a consensus that MUIS is both formally and informally co-
opted. Of the 30 interviews done, an overwhelming number of the respondents (26 or 
87%) agreed that MUIS is a statutory board and cannot be expected to serve the 
concerns of the community in every instance, as eventually, it has to answer to the 
state. Most of the survey respondents expressed similar views. Apart from the cases 
enumerated earlier, the silence of MUIS on the plight of the Muslim ummah (global 
community) such as in the cases of the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and the 
illegal Israeli occupation of Palestine, their perceived lack of support for the 
madrasahs in general, inter alia are highlighted by the respondents and interviewees 
to support their claims. 
 What is interesting though is that while there is acknowledgement that MUIS 
is co-opted, there seems to be an acceptance of such a situation by many Muslim 
Singaporeans. Undoubtedly, many of those interviewed/surveyed wish that the Mufti 
was more independent and MUIS was slightly more vociferous in championing for 
the rights of the community, but at the same time, they are fully cognizant of its 
limitations. According to Ustaz Hafiz, “MUIS has its restrictions because it is a 
government agency, so the Muslim community must bear this in mind when assessing 
it.”196
                                                          
196 Interview with Ustaz Hafiz Rafie, 1 February 2012. 
  Others intimated the same position. There is more than a tinge of realism in 
their appraisals; I argue that the Muslim community is intelligent enough to realize 
that in this secular state, a connection between the community and the state is 
necessary. This forbearance of MUIS’ affiliation with the state is unquestionably 
made possible due to the perception that MUIS has been serving other functions well; 
most respondents were pleased MUIS’ role in managing mosques, halal food, hajj 
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issues (with a few exceptions), zakat distribution and others. Clearly, there is a sense 
that the degree of independence sacrificed has yielded the necessary benefits.  
 Such a tolerance is, however, largely not displayed towards Pergas. The 
reasons for this will be explained in the coming chapter, but for now, it suffices to say 
that the magnanimity towards MUIS is contingent upon there being another 
organization that will perform the functions that MUIS cannot, and serve as its 
complement. 
 It has also been seen on certain occasions that there were blatant attempts by 
state to use MUIS’ imprimatur to endorse their own positions on a certain issue. This 
was evident in the hijab saga. Maidin Packer’s statement aimed to end the debate 
within the Muslim community by invoking the religious authority of MUIS and the 
Mufti. Packer used MUIS and the Mufti to justify that the state’s actions and stance. 
Such a move, Saeed argues, has been a feature of state-linked (co-opted) religious 
organizations as the state seeks to legitimize its authority with the cloak of divine 
ordinance.197
 Consequently, the state’s approach of muscular and calibrated secularism can 
be seen in its relationship with MUIS. Institutionally, MUIS is co-opted and serves as 
a statutory board under the jurisdiction of a government ministry. At the informal 
level, MUIS is careful not to issue any public statements or edicts that contravene 
state policies, and it even adopts state terminologies (pluralism, secularism etc) in its 
public statements. This formal and informal co-optation, while a response by MUIS 
towards an uneven power balance, is nevertheless a conscious choice it made in order 
to maximize the role it can play within the state-dominated political system.  
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Chapter 4: Religious Representation in Secular Singapore - Pergas  
While the case of MUIS was relatively more straightforward, Pergas is a 
different proposition altogether. It is difficult to ascertain the exact character of the 
relationship between it and the state, simply because superficially, there are hardly 
any direct connections between them and Pergas appears to be an independent body. 
Pergas can be described as a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) which has a 
specific cause to champion (all matters pertaining to the Islamic faith), unlike MUIS, 
which is a statutory board. 
 According to Hall, a non-profit or non-governmental organization can be 
defined “a body of individuals who associate for any of three purposes: 1) to perform 
public tasks that have been delegated to them by the state; 2) to perform public tasks 
for which there is a demand that neither the state nor for-profit organizations are 
willing to fulfil; or 3) to influence the direction of policy in the state, the for-profit 
sector or other nonprofit organizations.”198 Cormode specifically states that religious 
organizations come under this category.199
 Najam conceives four possible types of NGO-state relations: complementarity, 
confrontation, cooperation and co-optation. Co-optation is defined as attempts by 
either side to “change the preferences that others have about particular ends and 
means.”
 Pergas has definitely fulfilled all three 
objectives at some points in time, and hence shall be defined as an NGO in this paper.  
200
                                                          
198 Peter Dobkin Hall, “A Historical Overview of the Private Nonprofit Sector,” in The NonProfit sector: 
A Research Handbook, ed. Walter W. Powell (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 7. 
 I argue that while in the initial period that I am studying (1995-2012), 
Pergas adopted a confrontational attitude towards the state; however after 2004, the 
199 D. Scott Cormode, “Review Essay: Religion and the NonProfit Sector,” Nonprofit and Voluntary 
Sector Quarterly, 23 (1994): 71.  
200 Adil Najam, “The Four C’s of NGO-Government Relations: Complementarity, Confrontation, 
Cooperation, Co-optation,” (LEAD-Pakistan Occasional Paper No. 11, 2000), 9-13. 
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process of informal co-optation began. Institutionally, Pergas is independent, however 
ideologically/psychologically, their preferences about ‘ends and means’ have been 
altered. In this case, ‘calibrated secularism’ is the only approach employed by the 
state. 
 Again, co-optation is a dual-way process. Pergas willingly permits itself to be 
informally co-opted and thus was prepared to change its ends, in light of the benefits 
that it would attain. As will be discussed, the repercussions of this arrangement might 
ironically be more detrimental than beneficial to both the state and the NGO (Pergas). 
4.1 Historical Overview, Aims, Functions 
 Pergas was established in 1956, with the primary aim of providing and 
producing credible Islamic leadership and promoting asatizah development.201 
Interestingly, it aims to nurture asatizah who are not only propagators of the Islamic 
faith, but also “intellectuals, dakwah (spreading the religion) missionaries and 
community leaders.”202
  The usage of the term ‘ulama’ has a significant bearing on how Pergas 
formulates its self-identity.
 
203 The term itself means ‘someone learned’ or a ‘scholar’ 
but over the years, it has accrued much more significance within the Muslim world. 
‘Ulama’ are more than just religious teachers; they are regarded as the “guardians” 
and “guarantors” of the Islamic community, on top of being spiritual and intellectual 
guides.204
                                                          
201 Pergas, 
 At times, they might even be expected by the Muslim masses to perform a 
http://v1.pergas.org.sg/?page_id=7. (accessed 19 April, 2012). 
202 Pergas, http://pergas.weebly.com/home.html. (accessed 19 April, 2012).  
203 Pergas means ‘Persatuan Ulama dan Guru-Guru Agama Islam Singapura’, or Islamic Scholars and 
Religious Teachers Association. 
204 Chee Min Fui, “The History of Madrasah Education in Singapore,” (MA diss., National University of 
Singapore, 2000), 1. 
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political or social role,205 especially to ensure that the rights of Muslims, including the 
right to practise their religion, are protected. The ulama regard themselves as the 
custodians of the religion, as do the Muslim community.206
    “The ulama should be people who not only teach Islam, but also people who 
defend Islam and champion the causes of the Muslim community. While the 
ulama should not be directly involved in politics, they should be a form of 
pressure group and articulate the rights of Muslims. In fact, the Muslims expect 
this of people who call themselves ulama.”
 Pergas members 
themselves believe in this responsibility of the ulama. As stated in the previous 
chapter, Ustaz Hasbi believes that Pergas should be the “moral anchor” of the Muslim 
community. A former Pergas member concurs with this self-understanding of the role 
of the ulama and Pergas: 
207
  Pergas is a self-funded and officially independent entity. It relies mainly on its 
own investments and contributions from the Muslim community. It has no direct links 
with the state insofar as it does not come under the jurisdiction of any government 
ministry or officials. The Majlis Tertinggi Pergas (Executive Committee) consists of 
fourteen people, with five holding specific positions, namely the President, Vice-
President, Treasurer, Secretary and Assistant Secretary.
 
208 All fourteen members are 
elected to the committee by the members of Pergas at the Biennial General Meeting 
(BGM), last of which took place in December 2011. The President is chosen at the 
BGM; he then has the prerogative of choosing the other four office-holders.209
                                                          
205 Malika Zeghal, “Religion and Politics in Egypt: The Ulema of Al-Azhar, Radical Islam and the State,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 31 (1999): 373.  
  
206 Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman, “The Muslim Religious Elite of Singapore,” in Religious Diversity of 
Singapore, ed. Lai Ah Eng (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 248-249. 
207 Interview with Pergas member, 3 February 2012. 
208 As of July 2012, they are Ustaz Hasbi, Ustaz Kamal Mokhtar, Ustazah Khadijah Ramli, Ustaz Yusri 
Yubhi and Ustaz Bahrul Ulum respectively. 
209 Interview with Pergas member, 27 April 2012.  
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  There is thus no question of formal or institutional co-option, as Pergas does 
not rely on funds from the state, nor is there any state directive on the appointments of 
key office-holders.  
  An important organizational function of Pergas is its administration of the 
Asatizah Recognition Scheme (ARS). The scheme is set up by MUIS, with the 
purpose of stamping out deviant religious teachings. Under it, only those who are 
certified are allowed to teach Islamic religious knowledge in Singapore. Despite being 
an initiative of MUIS, Pergas is entrusted with managing the scheme.210 Not only 
does this reflect the symbiotic relationship between MUIS and Pergas, this 
demonstrates its immense influence in the Muslim community: Pergas has the 
authority to decide who can or cannot teach Islam in Singapore, admittedly based 
upon certain guidelines. It is, moreover, common for Pergas executive committee 
members to be on the MUIS Fatwa Council as well, and at this point in time, two of 
the council’s five permanent members are from Pergas.211
  Historically, the role of Pergas has undergone a series of changes. In the 
period leading up to the early 1990s, especially under the leadership of Ustaz Ali, 
Pergas did not have any engagements with the government or the society about moral 
issues or state-Muslim relations, and instead focussed on teaching the faith to 
Muslims.
 
212 However, under the leadership of Ustaz Syed Abdillah Aljufri, Pergas 
took a visibly more active role in social affairs.213
                                                          
210 MUIS, 
 The newer generation of Islamic 
http://www.muis.gov.sg/cms/services/Islamic.aspx?id=506 (accessed 2 May, 2012).  
211 They are Ustaz Hasbi and Ustaz Zulkifli. 
212 Kadir, “Islam, State and Society in Singapore,” 361. 
213 Interview with Pergas member, 14 March 2012. Many other respondents concurred. 
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religious teachers believe active engagement with the state and the society at large is 
vital for Muslims.214
  This study will specifically assess Pergas from 1995 to the current situation. 
This timeframe has been chosen for two reasons: firstly, there is not enough 
information on Pergas in the years prior to that and many of the asatizah that are 
involved with the organization today were not as involved back then (the seniors have 
already passed on). Secondly, what happened during this time period is what forms 
the perceptions of the community today, as many of them do not look back on or even 
remember much of Pergas’ role prior to that.
 
215
  I argue that Pergas has undergone a subtle, yet tremendous shift from the 
period 1995-2003/4, to 2003/4-now. During the initial period which was under Ustaz 
Abdillah’s presidency and even the early years of Ustaz Hasbi’s, Pergas was a 
staunchly independent entity, prepared to go heads-on with the state when there was a 
fundamental conflict of interests or values between the state and the community. In 
the latter years, for a range of reasons, Pergas has allied itself, albeit informally, with 
the state. Informal co-optation has ensued. 
  
4.2 Evidences of Informal Co-option: Statements, Actions and Inactions 
 Here I shall present four incidents, with contrasting responses from Pergas. 
The first two occurred pre-2004 while the others took place in the subsequent years.   
The Tudung / Hijab Issue (2002) 
 The vehement nature of the response by Pergas towards the government‘s no-
hijab stance was extraordinary. Not only was it unrelenting towards the state, it was 
                                                          
214 Kadir, “Islam, State and Society in Singapore,” 361. 
215 This could be to Pergas’ inactive societal role mentioned earlier. 
77 
 
equally firm towards MUIS. The refusal of Pergas to accept the matter as settled just 
because the Mufti issued a statement indicated their willingness to be an advocator of 
the rights of the Muslim community, even if it meant entering the public sphere. This 
is in spite of the state’s no-nonsense reaction to the episode, evinced by its vilification 
of Zulfikar. Pergas began to see itself as the lone voice capable of expressing 
Muslims’ concerns when they were in conflict with the state’s stand. It even promised 
the Muslim community that it would continue to champion the wearing of hijab in 
national schools.216
 These efforts did not go unnoticed by the Muslim community. It is no 
exaggeration to say that many Muslims began to view Pergas as the most reliable 
Muslim organization in Singapore, and looked to it for leadership and inspiration.
 
217
The Madrasah and CE saga 
  
 A similarly sturdy display of resistance was shown by Pergas in the 
Compulsory Education (CE) saga. While MUIS was non-committal, Pergas’s reaction 
was the exact opposite: bold and confrontational. Pergas did not bow down to Goh 
Chok Tong’s insistence that national needs were prioritized before religious ones,218 
but instead argued against the implementation of the scheme. It voiced its dissent in 
no uncertain terms, explicitly stating it would not tolerate the compromise of the 
“rights of Muslims to channel our children in accordance with our community’s 
needs.”219
                                                          
216 Interview with Pergas member, 5 April 2012.  
 Pergas viewed the CE proposal with cynicism, as did many Muslims, and 
believed that it would lead to the eventual closure of the madrasahs, something which 
217 Ng Tze Lin, ““The Role of Law in Managing God,” 11. 
218 Kam Yee Law, “The Myth of Multiracialism in Post- 9/11 Singapore: The Tudung Incident,” New 
Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, 5 (2003): 59. 
219 Suzaina Kadir, “Singapore: Engagement and Autonomy Within the Political Status Quo,” in Civil 
Society and Political Space in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space, ed. Muthiah 
Alagappa (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004), 346. 
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it deemed unacceptable.220 In spite of assurances by the Muslim MPs that the CE was 
not a “ploy” to shut the madrasahs, Pergas persisted with its stance and was 
unwavering. 221
 Ultimately, a settlement was reached when the state announced that the 
madrasahs would be exempted from the CE scheme for eight years, to enable them to 
prepare adequately for it.
  
222 This was, according to a Pergas member, a “moral 
victory” for Pergas, and highlights the influence it can have if it has the “moral 
courage” necessitated by the situation.223
 The madrasah issue indubitably turned Pergas from a low-profile organization 
into a “forceful advocacy group representing Muslim interests.”
   
224
 Along with these two incidents, there were other instances whereby Pergas 
took a courageous stand, most conspicuously in the case of the Singapore 
government’s support for the US invasion of Iraq. Most Muslims (and many non-
Muslims) were not convinced by the American claims of Iraq possessing weapons of 
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 Understandably, Muslims were outraged at the US’ unilateral 
manoeuvring, and more tellingly, disappointed at the PAP’s unambiguous support for 
the former. Pergas, together with three Muslim organizations, issued a statement 
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insisting that the government opposes the invasion, or at the very least, refrain from 
supporting it.226
 Nevertheless, while opposition towards the Iraq invasion helped to shape the 
community’s expectations of Pergas, the other two incidents resonated most with the 
Muslim community, as they directly impacted the locals.
 MUIS chose to remain silent on this, while Pergas again opted to be 
the voice for the Muslim community. 
227
 In these instances, it is manifest that the ends intended by Pergas did not 
conform to the state’s. As predicted by Najam, Pergas’ aggressive posturing and 
voluble attitude did not seem to endure through the years, as the process of co-
optation began to take root. Two incidents illustrate this change. 
 Pergas gained a lot of 
plaudits from the community, and even Pergas began to see its role in these terms: no 
longer was it content with merely imparting religious knowledge, rather it sought to 
position itself as an organization that engaged the state, for the benefit of the Muslim 
society. 
The Casino / Integrated Resorts Issue 
 Pergas, like MUIS, did not remained silent after Dr Yaacob had issued the 
statement, much to the chagrin of many Muslims. As Pergas had already acquired a 
reputation for being bold enough to disagree with the government or even the Mufti, 
many Muslims fully expected it to issue a statement to comment on the Minister’s 
declaration that Muslims can work in the IRs. The statement never came. This 
incident was mentioned by many of the interviewees and survey respondents.  
 
                                                          
226 Lily Zubaidah Rahim, Singapore in the Malay World: Building and Breaching Regional Bridges 
(Oxon, New York: Routledge, 2009), 104. 
227 Interview with community activist, 6 May 2012. 
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One Ustaz expressed his disappointment: 
“In the first place, the Minister should not pandai-pandai228 touch on the matter. In 
the second, the Mufti should have quickly issued a statement about the matter. And 
since that did not happen, Pergas should have stepped in and do what it is supposed to 
do – advise the government, in this case Yaacob Ibrahim and also, act as a check and 
balance against MUIS, which is state-affiliated. It did neither.”229
 A similar sentiment was expressed by many other respondents. A Muslim 
professional stated: 
 
“If our religious scholars do not deal with the religious issues, who else will? Pergas 
should have issued a statement on the casino issue, whether or not they agree with the 
statement. Otherwise, it sets a very dangerous precedent. The next time, a politician 
can just issue a fatwa and the scholars cannot do anything about it.”230
 From the interviews that were done with the asatizah, most of them expressed 
unhappiness or disappointment with the statement made by the Minister; the 
disgruntlement was more about the manner that the statement was issued than the 
content itself. They felt that the Minister should have just referred the matter to the 
Mufti and abstained from such a declaration. Many also felt that since the statement 
was made, Pergas should have issued one of its own. MUIS’ silence was, many felt, 
perhaps inevitable given it being an executive arm of the state but Pergas, an NGO 
that prided itself upon being the “conscience of the community”, did not have such an 
excuse. As it turned out, Pergas’ credibility took a hit with this silence. 
 
LKY’s remarks 
 In Lee Kuan Yew’s latest book, Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going, he 
states that Singaporean Muslims are separate and not integrated into the wider 
community. As such, he advised Muslims to be “less strict” in practicing their faith. 
                                                          
228 Being too smart for one’s own good, in Malay. 
229 Interview with community activist, 10 February 2012.  
230 Interview with Muslim professional, 7 May 2012. 
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He also articulates that he believes the Malays (Muslims) will never catch up with the 
other races in Singapore, in terms of educational and material achievements.231
 The fallout that ensued was almost unprecedented. There was an outcry from 
the Muslim community, with many publicly expressing their dissatisfaction at Lee’s 
apparent insensitiveness to Muslim sensibilities.
 
232 The hullabaloo eventually led to 
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong distancing his government from the comments of the 
elder Lee, highlighting the immense nature of the uproar.233
 Many Muslim organizations publicly expressed their dismay at Lee’s 
comments. AMP released a strongly-worded statement that condemned Lee’s 
comments, saying that they “hurt the community and are potentially divisive.”
  
234 
AMP called upon the state to clarify whether Lee’s comments were made in a 
personal capacity or reflected the government’s official stand (which as mentioned, 
they later did). It criticized Lee for chiding Muslims on the basis of their religiosity.235 
Perdaus labelled the comments as “unfair.”236 The Singapore Malay National 
Organization (PKMS), a Malay-based political party, went one step further and urged 
the government to investigate Lee under the Sedition Act.237 Even MUIS felt 
compelled to issue a statement and disagreed with Lee. MUIS said that Islam is not a 
barrier to integration whatsoever and that the desire to integrate is “an integral part 
and practice of the Singapore Muslim Community.”238
                                                          
231 See Lee Kuan Yew : hard truths to keep Singapore going , Han Fook Kwang ... [et al.] (Singapore: 
Straits Times Press, 2011). Also mentioned in Chapter 1. 
  
232 See “MM’s remarks on integration draw flak,” The Straits Times, 26 January 2011. 
233 News 5 Tonight, Channel 5, 30 January 2011. 
234 AMP. Accessed 7 May 2012. http://www.amp.org.sg/subindex.asp?id=A021_11.  
235 PKMS. Accessed 8 May 2012. http://www.pkms.org/pkmspressstatement.htm.  
236 Channelnewsasia. Accessed 8 May 2012. 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/1107603/1/.html.  
237 PKMS, http://www.pkms.org/MUIS.pdf (accessed 8 May, 2012).  
238 “Islam No Barrier to Integration,” The Straits Times, 28 January, 2011. 
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 Throughout the entire course of this episode though, Pergas chose to remain 
silent. There was not an official word, let alone statement, issued to address the 
comments. At a time when the Muslim community felt massively hurt and when other 
Muslim organizations took Lee to task for those comments (even the normally 
compliant MUIS felt obligated to disagree with Lee publicly, though in a mild and 
non-provocative manner), Pergas’ reticence was striking. The willingness to confront 
the state that was displayed previously was conspicuously missing. 
This, together with its similarly reserved position on the casino issue, 
highlights a shift in Pergas’ approach and priorities: it was no longer willing to 
intervene in societal affairs when the state was involved. This change, I argue, is 
indicative of the state’s informal co-option of the organization. To expound on this, 
the views of the respondents will be explored. 
4.3 Evidence of Informal Co-option: Interviews and Public Perceptions 
 There was almost unanimity amongst the respondents as to what Pergas’ role 
should be. Most felt that Pergas should not duplicate the role of MUIS and should do 
what MUIS is not doing, or rather, cannot do.239 The most prominent feature of this 
expectation is the role of voicing the concerns of Muslims.240
 While many of the respondents iterated their support for Pergas, they admitted 
that their support was on the wane. They believed Pergas used to fulfil the functions 
that were expected of it, but increasingly, it was not living up to expectations. Two 
members of the community took the unusual step of writing to Berita Harian and 
 As a corollary, 
involvement in social issues is demanded of Pergas as well. 
                                                          
239 Interview with Ustaz Hafiz Rafie, 1 February 2012. 
240 Interview with Pergas member, 3 February  2012. 
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asking for the President to be replaced due to Pergas’ affinity with the government.241 
Others were ‘whispering’ that the Pergas President and one its advisors had ‘sold-out’ 
to the government; a charge emphatically denied by the two in an interview with 
Berita Harian.242
“Post-2005, Pergas is not fulfilling its main function, which is to provide religious 
leadership. While Pergas excels in delivering religious education until today, it has no 
longer served the social aspect of religious leadership, and does not champion the 
causes of Muslims anymore. Look at the tudung issue, Pergas promised to continue 
pursuing it. But today,  Pergas does not seem interested at all in raising it up.
 An Ustaz states: 
243 
Pergas needs to return to serving the Muslim community.”244
 Another Ustaz, who has served in both MUIS and Pergas before in varying 
capacities, puts forth his point: 
 
“MUIS has limitations. Pergas has none. There is no reason why Pergas cannot say or 
do anything that is beneficial for the Muslim community, in principle. The problem 
now is, Pergas is getting too close to the government. Being close is alright, but 
getting too close is not advisable.”245
 Others echoed the Ustaz’s sentiments, believing that Pergas has moved too 
close to the state, such that the intimacy is inhibiting its actions. If Pergas ceases to 
perform the social aspect of its duties because of its relationship with the government, 
they argue, there will be no need for Pergas to exist since MUIS is already performing 
all the other functions that it executes.
 
246
                                                          
241 Yasser Arafat Abdullah, “Peluang Pergas ubah pimpinan dalam mesyuarat agung (Opportunity for 
Pergas to change its leadership during AGM,” Berita Harian, 14 September 2011 and Iskandar Jinan, 
“Harap Pergas berlapang dada dan terima pandangan masyarakat (May Pergas be open-minded and 
accept feedback from the community),” Berita Harian, 28 September 2011. 
 Pergas is perceived to not be acting as a 
check and balance against MUIS and the state as it is expected to, precisely because it 
is “too close to the state.” While the almost exclusively negative understanding of co-
242 Puad Ibrahim and Nazri Hadi, “Kami Ustaz Pemerintah? Astaghfirullah. (We are the government’s 
Ustaz? God forgive),” Berita Harian, 13 May 2006.  
243 Many other interviewees, both from the asatizah or otherwise, raised this point as well. 
244 Ibid. 
245 Interview with local Ustaz, 13 April 2012.  
246 Interview with Pergas member, 5 April 2012. 
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optation is a little myopic and discounts the nuances and decisions Pergas has to bear 
in mind, such perceptions are nonetheless revealing. 
 Many pinpoint the formation of the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) as 
the start of Pergas’ shift in stance towards the government. The RRG was formed 
voluntarily by a group of asatizah in 2003, with the aim of counselling and 
rehabilitating the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists.247 Though the asatizahs voluntarily 
formed the organization, with some prodding by the state,248 it has extremely close 
relations to the state to the point of providing information and assistance to the 
Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and the Internal Security Department (ISD) in 
countering religious extremism in Singapore.249
 The unearthing of terrorist cells in Singapore was a pivotal point in the nation-
state’s history, especially for the Muslims. Singaporeans did not expect terrorism to 
burgeon in their own backyard and this generated tensions within the society. Even 
though the mainstream Muslim community was equally shaken by the incident, they 
were inevitably met with suspicion and mistrust by the state, with the latter initially 
pointing the finger of blame at the community.
 The co-chairmen of RRG are Ustaz 
Ali (the advisor to Pergas) and Ustaz Hasbi. Its formation marked the beginning of 
amicable cooperation between the state and senior Pergas leaders. 
250
                                                          
247 Ministry of Home Affairs, 
 However, it quickly changed its 
approach and began to enlist the help of Muslim organizations to deal with the 
terrorist menace. Pergas was foremost on the list of organizations it approached, as its 
leaders were requested to support the RRG initiative. It was also asked by the 
http://www.mha.gov.sg/news_details.aspx?nid=NTA5-0gYKNZDJIes%3D 
(accessed 8 May, 2012).  
248 Zachary Abuza, “Hardening National Security: Emergence of an Agile Scorpion,” in Impressions of 
the Goh Chok Tong Years in Singapore, eds. Bridget Welsh, James Chin, Arun Mahizhnan and Tan Tarn 
How (Singapore, NUS Press: 2009), 192. 
249 RRG, http://www.rrg.sg/edisi/data/trans.pdf (accessed 8 May, 2012).  
250 Eugene Tan, “Keeping Politics and Religion Separate in the Public Sphere,” 207. 
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government to draft the “Charter of Moderation” as a guideline for the Muslim 
community, whereby it duly obliged.251
4.4 Reasons for Co-option 
 In light of the terrorism predicament, the state 
and Pergas started to put past differences aside in order to curtail a common problem.  
The State 
 Rather than being concerned about the benefits of co-opting the organization, I 
argue that the government was more anxious about the consequences of not co-opting 
Pergas. The hijab and madrasah incidents displayed a worrying trend: Pergas, under 
the leadership of religious scholars who are revered in the Muslim community, was 
able to mobilize support against the state, and was not afraid to convey its disapproval 
of state actions or recommendations. In fact, Pergas was even ready to disagree with 
the Mufti and MUIS publicly, despite the venerated position a Mufti usually enjoys in 
a Muslim society. Pergas became a significant player in the social scene and much to 
the state’s chagrin, ventured into the political arena. Just like AMP in the past, the 
intrusion by a religious group was not tolerable. As Hamayotsu states, the danger of 
excluding religious groups is they have the ability to mobilize the masses against the 
state.252
 Unlike the reaction to AMP, however, the state was more measured in its 
approach towards Pergas. The government probably realized that it was not possible 
to publicly rebuke religious scholars- especially those with the stature of Ustaz 
Abdillah and Ustaz Hasbi- as it would have a counter-productive effect. The Muslim 
community could easily turn against the state and rally even more strongly behind the 
 
                                                          
251 Zachary Abuza, “Hardening National Security,” 193. 
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religious scholars. Therefore, a ‘confrontational’ relationship was not possible. 
Moreover, at that point in time where Pergas was still championing the causes of the 
community, it was clear that their and the state’s goals were divergent, and hence, a 
‘complementarity’ relationship was out of the question too. 
 The state had only two choices: cooperation and co-optation, and I argue that 
they embarked on both. The state closely cooperated with and strongly supported the 
RRG, which was formed and led by senior members of Pergas.253 The state, via the 
Ministry of Home Affairs and in particular the ISD, heavily supports this programme, 
which is designed to rehabilitate Muslim terrorists and also prevent the spread of 
terrorism by countering the ideologies of the radical Muslim groups such as the 
Jemaah Islamiyah.254 By informally enlisting Pergas’ assistance to lead RRG,255
 
 the 
state had fulfilled a few things. Firstly, it could tap on the resources of the ulama 
through the provision of mainstream Islamic teachings, in order to fulfil a state 
objective, that is, the eradication of Muslim radicalism. Secondly, it created a 
relationship between Pergas and the state, via RRG, whereby each supports the other 
and thereafter, the tension between the two as a result of earlier confrontations was 
substantially reduced. Finally, and most importantly, it resulted in Pergas itself re-
aligning its goals: now Pergas leaders became more fixated on countering religious 
extremism, such that it almost abandons the role of being the ‘moral anchor’ of the 
community. Informal co-optation, which can be seen through the re-alignment of the 
NGO’s goals to be in tandem with the state’s, was the outcome.  
                                                          
253 The three main figures of RRG are Ustaz Ali, Ustaz Hasbi and Ustaz TM Fouzy (a current Pergas 
executive committee member and its former Vice-President.) 
254 RRG,  www.rrg.sg/edisi/data/Coping_with_threat_of_JI.pdf (accessed 3 May, 2012).   




 For Pergas the decision to re-align its goals was not matter of survival or a 
result of the state’s coercion; rather it was a conscious choice it made, in good faith, 
with the interests of the Muslim community in mind. As the threat of Muslim 
terrorism expanded, Pergas realized that it had to do three things (on top of its 
functions of providing religious educations and meeting the needs of the religious 
teachers): help eliminate the threat of terrorism, disassociate such elements from the 
purity of Islamic teachings and assist in rebuilding the trust between the state and the 
Muslim community.256 Senior statesmen constantly urged Muslims to denounce and 
condemn radical elements within the Muslim community, with Lee Kuan Yew and 
Goh Chok Tong demanding that Muslims take a firm stance against radical elements 
within the community.”257 It was evident that the state displayed some mistrust 
towards the Muslim community, especially in the initial period after the discovery of 
JI.258
 It can be surmised that Pergas leaders, sensing that mistrust towards the 
community would ultimately lead to even more detrimental repercussions, quickly 
moved to mitigate the situation. They stopped pursuing controversial issues in the 
public domain and stopped adopting a confrontational approach towards the state. 
They adopted a friendlier stance towards the state, cooperated closely with it 
(especially on terrorism, though not limited to this area) and have adjusted their end 
goal. In short, Pergas has allowed itself to be informally co-opted, for the 
aforementioned reasons. Ideological co-option can also be argued to take place as 
  
                                                          
256 Interview with Pergas member, 5 April 2012. 
257 National Security Coordination Centre, The Fight Against Terror: Singapore’s National Security 
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Pergas leaders has made the fight against terrorism its major priority, aligning itself 
with the state, and ensuring that its previous priorities (hijab etc) take a backseat.    
 The networks of interdependence between the state and Pergas have also been 
strengthened. Pergas is bestowed the authority by MUIS to oversee the ARS, which 
endows it with a significant amount of clout. Reinforcing these networks is part of 
MUIS’ and the state’s way to co-opt Pergas as far as possible and to prevent future 
confrontations. 
 A Muslim academic remarks: 
“While we can analyze the actions of Pergas critically, we should not be cynical of 
their intentions. I have no doubts that their recent closeness to the government had the 
interests of Muslims in mind. Perhaps they realized that the situation was drastically 
different after the JI network was discovered and had to regain the trust of the state, 
on the community’s behalf.”259
 This is a unique and fairly different type of ‘weapon of the weak’ and ‘passive 
resistance’: here, Pergas is reacting to the political and social climate through 
allowing itself to be informally co-opted, not for its own sake, but for the Muslim 
community. It did not stand to gain much as the state does not assist it financially nor 
materially, rather, it did so for the intangible benefit of regaining the trust of the 
government. In the process, it was no longer able to adopt the ‘confrontational’ 
approach towards the state that had reaped some dividends during the madrasah saga 
and that made Muslims rally behind it. These impressions of the costs and benefits of 
developing a stronger and closer relationship with the state are what factors in the 




                                                          
259 Interview with Muslim Academic, 15 March 2012. 
89 
 
4.5 Analysis and Conclusion 
 The respondents, many of whom include past and present Pergas members, 
have a well-defined idea of the tasks that Pergas should perform in the Muslim 
community. Apart from the technical duties expected of it, they believe that Pergas 
should be the conscience of the community and public official statements by Pergas in 
the past do indicate that the organization itself concurs. The delivery on such an 
expectation is what forms and shapes the community’s perceptions towards Pergas’ 
efficacy. 
 As mentioned earlier, many of the respondents, though disappointed with 
MUIS’ stance when the community’s interests were perceived to be opposed to the 
state’s, understood its limitations considering its status as a statutory board. However, 
the same respondents view Pergas as an independent entity or an NGO and do not 
believe that Pergas is limited by similar considerations. Hence, they are frustrated by 
Pergas’ recent posturing when it comes to the above-mentioned seemingly 
controversial issues. Some of them even argue that Pergas is in danger of becoming 
irrelevant if it ceases to be the ‘moral anchor’ of the community in a secular nation-
state. 
 The relationship between Pergas and the state can be described as a specific 
type of a ‘client-patron’ relationship, whereby both parties stand to benefit from such 
an arrangement. While the power balance is the relationship is unequal in favour of 
the state, Pergas is a possible source of mobilization and ideological support for the 
Muslim populace, as it had shown in the past. Thus the state had to adopt a 
cooperative approach towards it.  
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 Pergas, on the other hand, had to be more pragmatic about its decisions. Its 
involvement with RRG was a conscious choice made with the intention of not only to 
re-educate the terrorists, but also to develop stronger ties with the state with the 
purpose of gaining their trust on the behalf of the entire Muslim community. Pergas 
had already been seen, by both the state and the Muslim community, as legitimate 
representatives of the community and therefore was in a position to bridge the gap 
between the two sides. As explained earlier, the discovery of the JI movement in 
Singapore strained relations between the state and the Muslim populace, and Pergas 
took upon itself to mend the relations. In doing so, it had to abandon its hard-line 
approach of challenging the state publicly and rebuking its statements. This sense of 
pragmatism is not unique to Pergas or Muslim organizations, as many churches and 
Christian organizations have similarly realigned their priorities. The Bishop of the 
Anglican Church once remarked that churches are getting more involved in social 
services provisions as it “seems to be a matter of pragmatic survival as the secular 
state frowns upon public evangelism.”260
 The shift in approaches or priorities is again a direct result of the uneven 
balance of power in the relationship and is a weapon of the weaker party. Realizing 
that its combative approach would not mitigate the situation (discovery of terrorist 
cells that led to the state’s mistrust of Muslims) that had the potential to worsen and 
be even more disastrous for the Muslims, Pergas assumed a different weapon; one of 
cooperation, reconciliation and accommodation. This is the type of relationship that 
has been described in the literature as ‘accommodating’
  
261 or one of ‘complicity’.262
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have termed it as ‘informal co-option’ due to the particular nuances involved in the 
relationship: this is a specific type of complicity. 
 The state’s strategy of calibrated secularism is apparent in the case of Pergas. 
Realizing that muscular secularism, clamping down on Pergas leaders or formally co-
opting the organization, was not an option, it had to embark on a different course of 
action. This was because Pergas wielded considerable influence within the Muslim 
community and its ability to mobilize Muslim Singaporeans clearly concerned the 
PAP. At the same time, the state realized that religious leaders were best-placed to 
counter the terrorist ideology and hence enlisted the assistance of Pergas leaders. 
Pergas, on the other hand, responded to the changing circumstances (the discovery of 
the JI which led to subsequent mistrust and tensions between the state and the 
community) by deserting its previous approaches and even objectives, settling for a 
far less confrontational approach with the state by not pursuing controversial issues 
and by no longer publicly opposing the state. Pergas ended up shifting its objectives 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion  
This paper has attempted to explore the variety of secular policies that have 
been used by the Singapore state in its quest to maintain social order by ensuring 
religious harmony, and in the process, secure its tight-fisted grip on political power. 
The focus is on Islam and specifically, the two most important religious organizations 
in the Muslim community, MUIS and Pergas. While this study is one that has used 
Singapore as an empirical case-study, I argue that the typology introduced can be 
extended to other countries as well. 
5.1 Summary of Main Arguments 
 The main contributions of this paper to the literature are 1) the introduction of 
a more refined stratagem of managing religion, that is, ‘calibrated secularism’, 2) the 
identification that co-option has been a major modus operandus of states in quelling 
potential or actual dissent and 3) the assertion that co-optation is a two-way process, 
that involves active agency on the part of the co-opted entities. Ramakrishna’s model 
of secularism in Singapore has been tweaked significantly, using concepts by Scott 
and Saward. Works by Hamayotsu and Najam provide invaluable theoretical and 
empirical insights to the issue. Scott’s ‘weapons of the weak’ is important as in a 
statist approach (used especially in authoritarian and strong-state settings such as 
Singapore), the roles of other actors are often ignored. Applying Scott’s ideas to this 
paper gives it an added dimension: every ‘weak’ person or organization has a decision 
to make in the way it reacts to power imbalance, and in order to maximize its role 
within the system. The responses can be totally submitting to the will of the dominant, 
or completely resisting the existing order. More often than not though, the responses 
lie somewhere in between the two extremes. 
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 MUIS and Pergas exemplify this. The two organizations differ in their 
reactions to a state-dominant system that frowns upon religious assertion. While 
MUIS has allowed itself to almost completely submit to the will of the state, via 
formal and informal co-option, Pergas has in the past taken a confrontational 
approach, and more recently, eased up to greater cooperation with the government. 
Both organizations made conscious choices in determining the type of relationship 
they want to have with the state.  
 Saward’s analysis of co-optation was useful in that it provided a framework 
whereby co-optation was not reduced to an institutional and tangible form. Other 
types of (informal) co-optation exist, and rarely are these easily ascertained. I argue 
that it is this informal type of co-option that defines the relationship between the state 
and Pergas.  
 The perceptions of some members of the Muslim community were analyzed, 
in addition to the statements and actions of the two organizations. These perceptions 
paint an essential picture as, to analyze the true position of these organizations, the 
views of those whom they are supposed to serve must be taken into consideration. 
Members of the community who are not associated with either MUIS or Pergas also 
are better-positioned to objectively evaluate the nature of the relationship between 
them and the state. 
 However, the various methods of the state are not without consequences. This 
concluding chapter critically evaluates the possible repercussions of these strategies 




5.2 Possible Consequences of State Secularism  
 The comprehensive nature of Islam inevitably renders it unsuited to a secular 
worldview. Islam is viewed as a ‘way of life’ and therefore nothing should, in theory, 
be separated from the religion. Due to this understanding of Islam and its 
incompatibility with secularism, contestations for authority - both religious and 
political - arise in secular states with Muslim populations. While this problem is 
accentuated in Muslim-majority nations, countries with minority Muslim populations 
are not completely free from such troubles. 
  In Singapore, these contestations have manifested in many forms: from the 
radical extremists of JI who reject a secular government263
 Specifically, the strategies of muscular and calibrated secularism towards 
MUIS and Pergas are bound to be accompanied by some consequences. As the state 
adopts a tough, draconian approach in tandem with a gentler, informal co-optation, it 
is better able to oversee all religious activities conducted by these two organizations. 
This will help ensure that religious extremism is not allowed to take root in these two 
associations, and enable the state to immediately step in when extremist elements 
emerge within MUIS and Pergas.  
 and are intent on creating 
an Islamic state in the Malay Peninsula to the liberals who accept secularism as a vital 
component in a multi-religious society. MUIS chooses to embrace secularism openly 
while Pergas officially rejects such a notion. 
 In addition, as Pergas becomes less and less openly confrontational, its ability 
to mobilize the Muslim populace against the state is perhaps reduced. Religious 
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scholars, with the standing and stature they have in the community, are highly revered 
and possess mobilization capabilities. With the scholars on the side of the government 
- or at least not opposing it - there is less danger of such unpleasant confrontations, as 
in the hijab and madrasah sagas, and social order will be more likely to be 
maintained. These have already been discussed. 
 On the flip side though, as both MUIS and Pergas become closely affiliated 
with the state and as Pergas abandons its public championing of Muslim causes, less 
desirable outcomes might arise.  
5.2.1 State Secularism – The Other Side 
Pergas’ and MUIS’ intimacy with the state could lead to members of the 
Muslim community losing their trust in these organizations. As examined in various 
parts of this thesis, the concept of a secular government is not one that is easily 
accepted by all Muslims. Religious leaders who align themselves with secular states 
have, Saeed postulates, suffered from a loss of legitimacy.264 Saeed was, of course, 
investigating the cases of secular Muslim governments; hence the situation is 
compounded when the ulama are perceived to be collaborating with, or excessively 
supporting secular non-Muslim rulers. Goh Chok Tong himself shrewdly recognized 
this possibility when he warned that “religious leaders that are regarded as too pro-
government may not be credible to their ground.”265
The current fixation on explaining the emergence of Muslim terrorism and 
radicalism has yielded a few dominant explanations. Firstly, some Western scholars 
have tried to portray Islam as inherently irreconcilable with Western democratic 
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civilization, and hence a clash between cultures is unavoidable. This cultural 
explanation has been most famously expressed by Huntington.266 Even Lee Kuan 
Yew shares this view.267
A second analytical perspective that has been developed and is gradually 
gaining traction even amongst some Muslim scholars is the role of Wahhabism in the 
spread of radical ideologies. The proponents of this theory assert that the Wahhabi 
ideology encourages radicalism due to its strict and rigid adherence to and 
interpretation of Islamic texts. Desker contends that the spread of Wahhabism to this 
region is the direct cause of the rise of the Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia.
 
268 
Even some Muslim clerics, most notably Hisham Kabbani, vociferously maintain that 
Wahhabism is the main contributing factor towards extremism.269 There are 
undeniably many other causes that have been identified by analysts but these are less 
relevant and shall not be developed further.270
I argue that both these analytical positions are steeped in certain biases and 
closer to reflections of scholar-analysts from armchair perspectives than to realities on 
the ground. These views scarcely take into account the emotions and perspectives of 
the general Muslim populace, much less the terrorists themselves. The idea that Islam 
is an antithesis to modernity and the Western way of life has been discussed and 
refuted extensively by many scholars; Hefner even argues that Islamic culture can 
  
                                                          
266 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1996).  
267 Tom Plate, Conversations with Lee Kuan Yew, 117.  
268 Barry Desker, “The Jemaah Islamiyah Phenomenon in Singapore,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 
25 (2003): 495-498. 
269 Hisham Kabbani Interview. Acessed 3 June 2012. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WKHEXoA5y2M.  
270 For a more detailed discussion of the causes of terrorism, refer to Jason Franks, Rethinking the 
Roots of Terrorism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).  
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actually promote and nurture democratic growth.271 The claim that Wahhabism leads 
to terrorism is something that not only has not been shown empirically, but is flawed 
theoretically. It fails to take into account the differing natures of adherents to the 
Salafi/Wahhabi ideology and it fails to adequately identify the causal mechanism for 
one to lead to the other. Furthermore, it does not explain whatsoever instances of non-
Wahhabi inclined Muslims (or non-Muslims for that matter) inciting acts of terror or 
what is perceived as such; Hassan Al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood 
which for a long time has been regarded by many states as a militant and extremist 
organization, was a Sufi.272 By my estimation, the contestation for legitimacy between 
the Sufis and Salafis/Wahhabis in the Muslim world today has led to such theories 
being propagated even by Muslims (who are non-Salafi/Wahhabis) themselves.273
While perverted interpretations of Islamic teachings do contribute to 
radicalism, as acknowledged by scholars and the RRG,
  
274 and this view is espoused in 
the Singapore government’s White Paper on the Jemaah Islamiyah,275
                                                          
271 See Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2000). 
 there are other 
factors that are not often explicitly discussed that are equally, if not more pertinent.  
For one, the injustices towards Muslims, especially in but not limited to Palestine, 
have served as a rallying point for terrorists. It is a fact that the Palestinian issue 
deeply affects most, if not all Muslims throughout the world, not least because of 
continued global oblivion towards the plight of the oppressed Palestinians. Dr 
Mahathir believes that a huge portion of terrorism can be averted if the Palestinian 
272 Briggitte Marechal, The Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourse (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 
2005), 20. 
273 This is a gargantuan topic that deserves further research, and shall not be delved into further in 
this paper. 
274 Brek Batley, The Complexities of Dealing with Radical Islam in Southeast Asia: A Case Study of 
Jemaah Islamiyah (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and 
Asian Studies, Australian National University, 2003), 11-13. 
275 White Paper by Singapore Government, The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism 
(Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs, 2003). 
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crisis is solved.276 Goh Chok Tong has expressed a similar belief.277 RRG leaders 
have stated that the JI terrorists interviewed share this notion, and seek to exact 
vengeance on the US and its allies for this unfairness by.278 This is a colossal 
motivating factor behind Muslim extremism, although the picture is still incomplete. 
While the injustices of Muslims elsewhere do cause resentment, I argue that this 
resentment is usually translated into extremism only when these Muslims do not have 
a proper outlet to vent their frustrations. These extremists portray and genuinely 
perceive themselves to be the “true defenders of the Islamic community” and as the 
guardians of the faith.279
  The example of the Muslim Brotherhood should be a stark reminder to the 
Singapore state. The Brotherhood gained massive support within such a short period 
of time because it presented the ulama of Egypt as ‘sell-outs’ who were pandering to 
the secular Egyptian state and were not guarding the religion as they were expected to 
do.
 This is because the ulama cease to be seen as such and once 
this happens there is a vacuum in the claim to religious legitimacy. As such 
alternative claimants - mostly in the form of extremist groups - emerge. While not all 
of these groups resort to acts of terror, it is clear some of them believe terrorism is 
justified.  
280
                                                          
276 See his letters to Bill Clinton and Jacques Chirac in Abdullah Ahmad, compiler., Dr Mahathir’s 
Selected Letters to the World: Introduction and Selected Commentaries by Abdullah Ahmad (Selangor 
Darul Ehsan: Marshall Cavendish, 2008).  
 When the masses concurred with the situation portrayed by the Brotherhood, 
they supported the movement to the point of severely threatening the Egyptian 
leadership. Offshoot movements arose in other parts of the Muslim world, for similar 
reasons, and often these were more violent and militant. Such was the response of the 
277 Goh Chok Tong, Winning Against Terrorism, 18. 
278 Interview with Ustaz Ali in Abdul Halim Kader, compiler, Fighting Terrorism: The Singapore 
Perspective (Singapore: Taman Bacaan Pemuda Pemudi Melayu, 2007), 177. 
279 Brek Batley, The Complexities of Dealing with Radical Islam in Southeast Asia, 3. 
280 See Marechal, The Muslim Brothers in Europe. 
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Muslim populace to the secularism that was prevalent in these nations, and more 
importantly, to the perception that the ulama were not credible. 
The type of secularism employed in Singapore vis-a-vis could lead to a similar 
situation. With MUIS being formally co-opted as a statutory board, and Pergas 
gradually developing closer ties with the state and ceasing to champion the 
community’s causes, the Muslim religious leadership in Singapore might lose 
legitimacy amongst its constituents, as Goh had feared. Not only will the ability of 
these two organizations to execute their functions be severely impeded without the 
trust of the Muslims, more worryingly, substitute claimants to religious legitimacy 
might surface. The door to extremism, which has hitherto been relatively well-shut, 
could re-open.  
Therefore, the state could consider a move towards liberal secularism in its 
dealings with Pergas. It should allow Pergas some room to manoeuvre and return to 
vociferous actor it was during the hijab and madrasah crises, and Pergas should not 
allow itself to be inhibited by any form of association it has with the state. Preferably, 
senior Pergas members should not be directly involved with the RRG, especially in a 
leadership capacity. This will drastically reduce the interdependence between the state 
and Pergas, and will moreover affect the perceptions of the community towards it in a 
positive manner. Pergas should actively champion Muslim causes, and should be 
allowed to do so by the state, in a non-violent yet forthcoming manner, as it did in the 
past, and not unlike civil society organizations in other countries.  
However, with regards to MUIS, the status quo should persist. MUIS should 
remain as an organization that is formally co-opted, with the responsibilities of 
oversight it is currently entrusted with. The wisdom behind this is so that firstly, there 
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remains a link between the state and the community, and this is much needed in order 
to maintain trust between the sides, secondly, MUIS can act upon its powers in case 
of the emergence of deviant and extremist organizations and finally, it can administer 
the affairs of the Muslims in a smooth manner with guaranteed financial and 
constitutional capabilities. Co-optation, this author reiterates, is not necessarily a 
negative thing, and I argue that in the case of MUIS it most certainly is not. The 
community is willing to tolerate a MUIS that is co-opted by the state, contingent upon 
the existence of a balancing body that can serve as a check and balance to MUIS in 
terms of religious matters. Pergas is the sole candidate to serve that role.  
5.3 Limitations of Study and Future Research 
This study is, admittedly, not without limitations and areas for improvement. 
First, a wider sample of respondents and more statistically robust techniques could be 
employed to ascertain the perceptions of the Muslim community towards these 
organizations. Secondly, one of the difficulties involved was the tendency of Muslims 
to not be fully critical of the ulama, and often the author found the respondents to be 
holding back negative comments about these religious scholars. Thirdly, it must be 
noted that both Pergas and MUIS are not monolithic organizations, and deeper 
investigations are needed to ascertain their decision-making structures, and the 
politics involved in them. Due to an absence of such studies, this paper has treated 
them as homogenous decision-making entities. 
Despite these limitations, this thesis provides a useful starting point for a topic 
that, although discussed by some, has not been delved into particularly deeply. The 
perceptions of members of the community provide valuable insights for the 
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organizations and the analysis of the state’s secularism have theoretical and empirical 
contributions to the literature.  
Moving ahead, more studies of the historical developments of religious 
organizations - not just Muslim ones - are needed in Singapore. As religion continues 
to remain relevant for Singaporeans and will persist in being a preoccupation for the 
secular state, it is important to establish the exact nature of these organizations, their 
historical evolutions, what they stand for and their capacity to contribute to the 
political system and Singapore society. For the Muslim community in particular, the 
growing divisions between the Sufis and Wahhabis should be studied and the 
repercussions of such sectarianism should be critically analyzed, in terms of how 
these organizations are affected.  
Secularism and religion will remain emotive and hotly-debated issues. This 
thesis has endeavoured to discuss the types of secularism, the consequences of those 
types and even to recommend an alternative for the Singapore state. Similar studies 
could be done in other countries and to other religions, where parallels and 
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1) Ustaz Hafiz Rafie, ex-Pergas Executive Committee and Associate Fatwa Council 
member, 1 February 2012. 
2) Community Activist, female, 32, 2 February 2012.  
3) Community Activist, 2 February 2012.  
4) Pergas Member, 3 February 2012. 
5) Community Activist, male, 39, 10 February 2012. 
6) Muslim Post-Graduate Student, 28, 15 February 2012. 
7) MUIS Personnel, 20 February 2012. 
8) MUIS Personnel, 14 March 2012. 
9) Muslim Academic, 15 March 2012. 
10) MUIS Personnel, 20 March 2012. 
11) Muslim Professional, 23 March 2012. 
12) Pergas Member, 25 March 2012. 
13) Muslim Professional, male, 27, 4 April 2012. 
14) Pergas Member, 5 April 2012. 
15) Muslim Academic, 10 April 2012. 
16) Community Activist, 10 April 2012. 
17) Local Muslim Undergraduate, male, 23, 11 April 2012. 
18) MUIS Personnel, 12 April 2012. 
19) Local Ustaz, 13 April 2012. 
20) Local Muslim Post-Graduate Student, 28, 14 April 2012. 
21) Pergas Member, 27 April 2012. 
22) Community Activist, 3 May 2012. 
23) Local Muslim studying in an Islamic University overseas, male, 22, 5 May 2012. 
24) Local Muslim studying in an Islamic University overseas, male, 27, 5 May 2012. 
25) Community Activist, 6 May 2012. 
26) Muslim Professional, 7 May 2012. 
27) Community Activist, 8 May 2012. 
28) Muslim Professional, 10 May 2012. 
29) Muslim Professional, 11 May 2012. 
30) Community Activist, 16 May 2012. 
 
 
* Due to the sensitive nature of the project, all but one of the respondents desired 
to remain anonymous. To further protect the identities of the respondents, it is not 
stated here whether the position held is a current or former post; for example, 
Pergas member could refer to a former or present Pergas member (either a 
normal or an executive committee member), and so on. MUIS personnel could 
refer to a former/present staff of MUIS or Council Member.  
  
** Community activist refers to someone who has been involved in any community 
organizations, currently or otherwise. This includes Mendaki, AMP, Perdaus, 








Appendix B: Survey 1 
Name: ______________________________________________________________ 
Sex:  M / F* 
Age: ____ 
Profession: __________________________________________________________ 
Contact Number: __________________ 
Email: ______________________ 
 
1) Do you support a football team? If so, which team is it? 
 
2) Name the three madrasahs that are under the direct purview of the government. 
 
3) Who is the current MUIS President? 
 
4) How did you find the Youth Olympic Games to be? Why? 
 
5) Do you think that living costs are too high in Singapore? 
 
6) Name five of the eleven PAP Malay Members of Parliament. 
 
7) In which year did Singapore join the Federation of Malaysia? 
 
8) Name three major Muslim organizations in Singapore. 
 
9) Will you ever consider emigrating? 
 













1) What is your opinion on the role that MUIS should have within the Muslim 
community? Why? 
2) Is MUIS currently playing this role? Why? 
3) What is your perception on the nature of the relationship between MUIS and the 
state? 
4) What is your opinion on the role that Pergas should have within the Muslim 
community? Why? 
5) Is Pergas currently playing this role? Why? 
6) What is your perception on the nature of the relationship between Pergas and the 
state? 
7) Do you have any suggestions for MUIS and Pergas, as to how to make them better 
organizations?  
 
*The questions for the second survey are the same as for the interviews. 
 
